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The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal 
Employment Opportunity 
t Anne Lawton 
[O]ur legal scheme against discrimination would be little more than a 
toothless tiger if the courts were to require . . . direct evidence of 
discrimination. 
-Marzano v. Computer Science Corp. 1 
Protections in law should be protections in fact. 
-President Clinton2 
Two years ago, I developed an exercise for my students, 
most of whom major in business, in the hope of creating 
classroom discussion about what the word "qualified" means in 
the context of employment decisions. I had been frustrated by 
the students' beliefs that employers could select with accuracy 
the most qualified candidate for any particular position and 
that affirmative action worked to rob qualified white and male 
candidates of jobs. I figured that, with a well-written exercise, 
I could convince my students of the malleability and 
imprecision of hiring criteria and the fallacy that merit alone 
determines employment success.3 
The exercise required students to act as members of a 
municipal hiring committee charged with choosing between 
John Williams and Cathy Jones, two white police officers, for a 
road officer position with the City, a suburban working class 
t Visiting Assistant Professor, Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern 
University. A.B., J.D., M.B.A., University of Michigan. This Article is 
dedicated to my father, Thomas J. Lawton, who instilled in me a belief in a 
fair and just world. I also would like to thank the following persons who 
provided feedback on drafts or who helped me work through the ideas in this 
Article: Rebecca Luzadis, Kay Snavely, Joshua Schwarz, David Walsh, and 
Elaine Yakura. 
1. Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 507 (3d Cir. 1996). 
2. President Clinton on State of Union: 'The Strongest It Has Ever Been,' 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2000, at A16. 
3. See infra Part I. C. (discussing the reality of workplace opportunity). 
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community of 200,000 residents.4 I deliberately designed the 
exercise so that Williams and Jones had different strengths, 
which often is the case in hiring and promotion decisions.5 
To draw attention to the problems posed by subjective 
criteria, I included, as a hiring criterion, an interview by three 
male police officers, two of whom worked for the City and one 
who worked for a neighboring police department. The 
interview panel gave Williams a 49 out of 50 on his interview, 
and Jones a 42 out of 50. The panel felt that Jones knew the 
law very well, in particular the law on search and seizure, but 
it believed that Jones was "not aggressive enough" in her 
responses to some of the hypothetical situations posed. 
I also included information about the City's affirmative 
action plan, which provided that the City could consider a 
candidate's race or sex in an employment decision when 
candidates were equally qualified. Finally, the exercise 
contained information about the number of women officers (10 
out of 240) and evidence of both past and current sex 
discrimination within the police department.6 
I fully expected that at least half of the students would 
select Jones for the police officer position. I was wrong. The 
majority of students believed that Williams clearly was the 
more qualified candidate, even when Jones had better objective 
4. The exercise is loosely based on the experiences of Kathleen Lawton 
as a police officer for a large suburban police force. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 170-74. Williams had a college 
degree, had won several shooting contests and was an expert with handguns. 
His father was a twenty-year veteran on the police force. Jones had earned a 
college degree and a law degree, and had experience as a law student intern in 
the Juvenile Justice Division of the state's largest municipality. 
Both Williams and Jones had road experience. I changed the length of 
that experience to determine whether the number of years worked on the road 
would alter students' perceptions of Williams's and Jones's qualifications. 
Even when Jones had more years of road experience than Williams, however, 
a majority of the class selected Williams as the more qualified candidate. 
6. The exercise contained several pieces of evidence suggesting both past 
and present discrimination within the police department. First, in 1975 two 
women officers sued the City because the police department had a policy that 
forbade women from "working the road." (The phrase "working the road" 
means going out in a squad car to patrol the City.) Second, even though the 
City settled the lawsuit, few male officers currently ride with female partners 
because the men believe the women are not good "back up." Third, a number 
of female officers have complained about the "macho" attitudes of many male 
officers. Two of the ten female officers on the force have complained about 
sexual harassment on the job. 
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qualifications, such as more relevant education and more road 
experience. 7 
Few students saw any problem with the subjective nature 
of the interview. They took the interview "scores" at face value, 
believing they demonstrated some quantifiable quality about 
the candidates. A few students picked up on the phrase "not 
aggressive enough" as a sex-based stereotype, but many other 
students believed that phrase simply reflected the interview 
panel's accurate assessment of Jones's ability to analyze the 
hypothetical situations posed. 
Moreover, the significant disparity in numbers of male 
versus female officers, the history of sex discrimination within 
the police department, and the attitudes of male officers toward 
female officers did not figure in most students' analyses. For 
example, few students questioned the interview scores based on 
the composition of the interview panel. For many of the 
7. I have used this exercise in five different classes: four sections of an 
introductory business law course and one section of employment law. In four 
of the five classes, a majority of the class selected Williams as the more 
qualified candidate. Only one class, a section of the introductory business law 
course, selected Jones as the more qualified candidate. That occurred during 
the fall of 1999 when I altered the exercise so that Williams and Jones had 
equal years of road experience. When I changed the exercise again so that 
Jones had more years of road experience than Williams, a majority of the class 
still selected Williams as the more qualified candidate. Some students did so 
on the basis of the interview score, while others cited his facility with a 
handgun as an important factor in their decision. 
The students' responses are consistent with the results of a research study 
on whether an applicant's sex and gender influence the applicant's desirability 
for particular occupations. See Patricia C. Judd & Patricia A. Oswald, 
Employment Desirability: The Interactive Effects of Gender-Typed Profile, 
Stimulus Sex, and Gender-Typed Occupation, 37 SEX ROLES 467, 474 (1997). 
Judd and Oswald found that "masculine" men were considered most desirable 
in terms of employability for a position as a firefighter. Id. at 471-72. The 
researchers used terms such as "ambitious," "strong-willed," and "determined" 
to describe "masculine" gender traits. See id. at 470. Judd and Oswald found 
no differences in the way that men and women evaluated the employment 
desirability of the applicants. Id. at 475. This latter result is not consistent 
across studies. Id. at 475; see also Jennifer J. Deal & Maura A. Stevenson, 
Perceptions of Female and Male Managers in the 1990s: Plus c;a Change ... , 
38 SEX ROLES 287, 298-99 (1998) (finding significant differences in the 
characteristics attributed by men and women to successful women managers); 
cf. John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary 
Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in 
CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 3, 18 (Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998) (reporting that white evaluators gave 
higher ratings to a "highly qualified white applicant, with exactly the same 
credentials" as a highly qualified black applicant). 
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students, the fact that one of the officers haled from a different 
department validated the interview as an objective procedure. 
AB I listened to the discussion, I realized that the students8 
explained their decision by reference to what I call the 
"meritocracy myth."9 The meritocracy myth reflects dominant 
cultural assumptions about employment opportunity and 
success, and is comprised of two interconnected beliefs. The 
first is an assumption that employment discrimination is an 
anomaly. The second is a belief that merit alone determines 
employment success. 
Increasingly, these assumptions about employment 
opportunity and merit are driving federal court decisions in 
employment discrimination cases. An analysis of recent federal 
cases involving challenges to hiring, promotion, or discharge 
decisions based on race, 1° sex, ll race and sex, or retaliation 12 
8. You could argue that college students do not know much about hiring 
and promotion decisions and, hence, their beliefs about the system are not 
relevant. Yet my students' beliefs accurately reflect dominant cultural 
assumptions about discrimination and merit. Most white Americans, for 
example, believe that discrimination does not impair employment 
opportunities for black Americans. See infra notes 23, 32-35, and 
accompanying text. In addition, a majority of Americans attribute success to 
ability and hard work, not luck. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
9. Myths are fictional stories about the origins of the world or of a 
particular culture. Larger-than-life heroes and gods and goddesses often 
people these stories, which are true in the sense that they reflect the psyche of 
that particular culture. DAVID LEEMING & JAKE PAGE, MYTHS, LEGENDS, AND 
FOLKTALES OF AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 3 (1999). In this Article, I use the 
term "myth" as a form of "group delusion-a widely held belief that is simply 
not true." Id. at 3. 
10. Although other racial minority groups experience discrimination in 
employment, the race discrimination cases and studies discussed in this 
Article primarily focus on the experiences of black men and women. 
11. I use the term "sex" rather than "gender" in this Article. As the case 
law indicates, however, Title VII applies to discrimination based not only on 
biological sex, but also on cultural stereotypes associated with one sex or the 
other. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989). Thus, in 
this Article, the phrase "sex discrimination" encompasses discrimination on 
the basis of biological sex as well as gender. 
12. This Article is based on the results of two LEXIS searches, which 
produced a total of 365 federal district court and U.S. court of appeals cases. I 
used the following search: "(((Legitimate pre/3 nondiscriminatory) pre/3 
reason) or pretext) w/50 (((more or most or better or best or high*** or 
superior or strong*** or less or inferior or poor*** or weak*** or lower) w/20 
(qualification* or qualified or qualit*** or credential* or interview* or 
resume*)) or unqualified) and ((sex or gender or race or black or white or 
African) w/10 discriminat***)." 
The first search, which produced a total of 238 cases, covered all federal 
district court cases for the two-year period starting on January 1, 1998 and 
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reveals that many federal courts adhere to a narrow and 
outmoded conception of discrimination as overt, negative, and 
conscious bias.13 Because many federal courts fail to recognize 
that discrimination now manifests itself in more subtle ways, 
they often grant summary judgment to employers because 
plaintiffs have not offered evidence that conforms to the courts' 
model of traditional prejudice. By doing so, these courts reflect 
and reinforce cultural beliefs central to the meritocracy myth. 
In Part I of this Article, I contrast the elements of the 
meritocracy myth with the reality of employment opportunity 
for blacks and women in today's market. Part II provides an 
analysis of recent federal court decisions involving disparate 
treatment claims of race, sex, race and sex discrimination, or 
retaliation. I conclude that the federal courts are chipping 
away at the ability of plaintiffs to construct successful cases of 
intentional discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. 
In Part II.B, I examine the trend in the federal courts toward 
narrowing the inquiry into the legitimacy of the employer's 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason so that employers may 
prevail on a motion for summary judgment even when the 
plaintiff presents evidence that the challenged employment 
decision was illogical or unreasonable. Part II. C explores how 
some federal courts have improperly converted contested issues 
of fact into issues of law, making it easier for employers to win 
ending December 31, 1999. The second search, which produced a total of 127 
cases, covered all U.S. court of appeals decisions for the four-year period from 
January 1, 1996 through December 31, 1999. 
I eliminated 65 cases from the federal district court pool of cases and 42 
from the court of appeals pool because the cases (1) raised claims of neither 
race nor sex discrimination, nor retaliation based on asserting claims of race 
or sex discrimination; (2) did not involve an employment law issue, such as a 
housing discrimination complaint; (3) raised claims only of reverse race, sex, 
or race and sex discrimination; or (4) would have involved double counting, 
such as motions to reconsider or rehearings en bane. (If a plaintiff alleged 
national origin discrimination, but not race or sex discrimination, I eliminated 
the case from the pool of cases. The plaintiffs allegations determined whether 
I treated the case as one of discrimination based on national origin, race, or 
race and national origin. Deleting the national origin claims did not alter the 
summary judgment figures contained infra at note 140.) I also excluded cases 
where the plaintiff claimed retaliation based on having previously asserted 
claims other than race or sex discrimination. 
This left 173 federal district court cases and 85 U.S. court of appeals 
cases, or a total of 258 cases. I based my summary judgment calculations on 
this remaining pool of258 cases. See infra note 140. The results of the search 
are on file with the author. 
13. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
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summary judgment motions. In Part II.D, I explain how both 
the Fifth and the Tenth Circuits have raised the evidentiary 
bar for plaintiffs, even at the summary judgment stage, by 
requiring plaintiffs to provide evidence that their qualifications 
are clearly or overwhelmingly better than the candidate 
selected by the employer. Part II.E examines the decisions of 
those courts that have adopted the ''honest belief' standard. 
This standard effectively requires the plaintiff to provide direct 
evidence of discrimination by insulating from judicial review 
any challenged employment decision where the employer can 
claim that it honestly believed it promoted the most qualified 
candidate. Finally, in Part II.F, I argue that the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc., 14 in which the Court rejected the mandatory 
pretext-plus approach followed by several circuits, will have 
little impact on the alarming rate at which federal courts grant 
employer motions for summary judgment and judgment as a 
matter oflaw. 
While substantial research describes how discrimination in 
today's market operates in subtle ways, the federal courts 
increasingly are requiring plaintiffs to provide evidence of overt 
and traditional forms of bias in order to prevail in disparate 
treatment cases. Instead of adapting the flexible 
circumstantial evidence case to address the changing nature of 
employment discrimination, many federal courts have 
transformed the circumstantial evidence case into a "toothless 
tiger."15 By doing so, the courts reinforce dominant cultural 
beliefs about equal opportunity and, at the same time, ensure 
that employment discrimination continues to deny equal 
opportunity to certain members of the American work force. 
I. THE MERITOCRACY MYTH AND THE REALITY OF 
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The stories that a culture creates about itself reflect the 
values and beliefs that its people cherish. These myths and 
legends16 "are like those mirrors in which we apply makeup or 
14. 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). 
15. See Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 507 (3d Cir. 
1996) (using the phrase). 
16. Unlike myths, legends "tend to be based on actual events and persons 
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even disguises, desigrlln.g images of who we think we are, how 
we believe we should appear to the world, and how we think we 
should perform in it."17 One such story, the distinctly American 
myth of the self-made man, as epitomized by the Horatio Alger 
story, 18 underscores the American belief that any person can 
succeed, regardless of birth or upbringing, so long as he 
possesses sufficient talent, grit, and determination. Although 
the Horatio Alger story no longer dominates the American 
cultural landscape, a similar meritocracy myth has evolved to 
explain and rationalize differences ·in achievement and success 
within the United States today. 
The meritocracy myth is the product of two intertwined 
beliefs. The first, which is critical to the structure of the myth, 
is the belief that employment discrimination no longer exists 
for blacks and women. It is a conception of discrimination as 
traditional prejudice: overt, conscious, and negative bias.19 
While acknowledging that historic discrimination once served 
to compromise the American belief in equal opportunity, such 
discrimination is now considered a relic of the past. Second, 
because race and sex discrimination no longer restrict 
employment opportunities for qualified blacks and women, 
current employment decisions are viewed as objective and fair. 
Unless affirmative action interferes with the decision making 
process, the belief is that merit alone ensures that the most 
qualified individual receives the job. According to the myth, 
differences in outcomes result not from unequal opportunity 
and discrimination, but from unequal talent and effort.2o 
The meritocracy myth draws on a long legacy of American 
stories about opportunity and accomplishment. 21 Its success as 
and, over time, are carefully tailored, often exaggerated, and serve to express 
some group aspiration." LEEMING & PAGE, supra note 9, at 5.,Davy Crockett 
is an example of an American legend. See id. 
17. Id. at3. 
18. This example is drawn from LEEMING & PAGE, supra note 9, at 4. 
19. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
20. See SONIA OSPINA, ILLUSIONS OF OPPORTUNITY: EMPLOYEE 
EXPECTATIONS AND WORKPLACE INEQUALITY 13-14 (1996) (describing how 
over time Americans have stubbornly held to the belief that unequal economic 
rewards stem from differences in individual motivation, not opportunity, to 
succeed). 
21. The belief that hard work and ability, not luck or help from other 
people, account for success has remained fairly stable among Americans over 
the past sixty years. See id. at 14. Clarence Thomas, the 106th justice to sit 
on the United States Supreme Court, exemplifies this belief-a modern-day 
Horatio Alger. See JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE 
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a myth lies in its ability to capture the spirit of American 
beliefs about employment opportunity and economic success. 
But while the myth may capture dominant American beliefs, 
those beliefs fail to accurately reflect the reality of employment 
opportunities for blacks and women in the United States today. 
B. THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 
The cornerstone of the meritocracy myth is the belief that 
employment discrimination against blacks and women is "a 
thing of the past."22 A majority of white Americans do not 
believe that race discrimination affects employment 
opportunities for black Americans in today's market. 23 For 
example, corporate CEOs "perceive well-educated and 
experienced African American men as having unlimited 
opportunities in Corporate America.''24 Similarly, the presence 
of significantly more women in traditionally male fields is 
offered as evidence that sex discrimination no longer operates 
SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS 31-61 (1994) (discussing the mythology 
surrounding Thomas's Pin Point, Georgia childhood). News stories commonly 
referred to Thomas's humble origins in Georgia. See Sam Fulwood III & 
Douglas Jehl, Thomas Takes Oath as Justice of High Court, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
19, 1991, at A1; Julia Malone, Dozens of Georgia Kin See Thomas Sworn In, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 19, 1991, at A7; Susan Page, The 106th Justice; 
Amid Supreme Pomp, Clarence Thomas Is Sworn In, NEWSDAY, Oct. 19, 1991, 
at 5; Joan Verdon, The Week in Reuiew, THE RECORD, Oct. 20, 1991, at A22. 
His ascent to the Supreme Court from a childhood spent in the segregated 
South and as the grandson of a poor sharecropper appealed to many 
Americans. Thomas's rise to the Court reinforced the basic American belief 
that any person in the United States, black or white, rich or poor, can reach 
the pinnacle of success if he has talent, works hard, and is determined to 
succeed. 
22. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER 
INEQUALITY 143 (1997) ("[W]omen's recent history in American workplaces 
looks like a triumphant tale. Once upon a time, sex discrimination sometimes 
happened, but those days are gone."); Steven A. Tuch & Michael Hughes, 
Whites' Racial Policy Attitudes, 77 Soc. SCI. Q. 723, 726 (1996) (stating that 
most white Americans believe race discrimination has been effectively 
eliminated). 
23. See Lawrence Bobo & James R. Kluegel, Opposition to Race-Targeting: 
Self-Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitudes?, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 
443, 459 (1993) (stating that "54 percent of blacks see 'a lot' of discrimination 
in jobs compared to only 24 percent of whites"); Tuch & Hughes, supra note 22, 
at 726 (stating that "a majority of whites believe blacks do not encounter 
racially based barriers to economic progress" (citation omitted)). 
24. THE FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GoOD FOR BUSINESS: 
MAKING FuLL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL: THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
SCAN: A FACT-FINDING REPORT OF THE FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION 
66 (1995) [hereinafter GLASS CEILING REPORT] (emphasis added). 
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as an impediment to the progress of women in the workplace. 25 
Male CEOs believe that women have shattered the glass 
ceiling.26 Poll results demonstrate that men "interpret[] small 
advances in women's rights as big, and complete, ones; they 
believe[] women ha[ve] made major progress towards 
equality .... "27 The dominant story about employment 
opportunity in the United States today is that American 
employers have dismantled the barriers to workplace 
opportunity. Jobs are no longer overtly segregated by race28 or 
sex.29 Discrimination, if it exists, is an anomaly. 
Yet, by all objective measures, white men still are doing 
significantly better in the workplace than blacks and women.30 
The meritocracy myth, however, does not demand equal 
outcomes; it focuses on equal opportunity. ''What [American] 
society cherishes most is the notion of equality before the law, 
which, in theory, results in the opportunity for individuals to 
25. Nijole V. Benokraitis, Sex Discrimination in the 21st Century, in 
SUBTLE SEXISM: CURRENT PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 5, 6 (Nijole 
V. Benokraitis ed., 1997) (citing articles about women's progress and the 
diminishing role of sex discrimination). See generally RHODE, supra note 22, 
at 1-20 (describing the denial of the persistence of sex discrimination in 
employment opportunities, pay, and allocation of family responsibilities). 
26. See GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 144 ("Seventy-three 
percent of the male CEOs said they don't think there is a glass ceiling [for 
women]; seventy one [sic] percent of the female vice presidents think there 
is."). 
27. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST 
AM:ERICAN WOMEN 60 (1991); see also Beth Bonniwell Haslett & Susan 
Lipman, Micro Inequities: Up Close and Personal, in SUBTLE SEXISM: 
CURRENT PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 39, supra note 25 ("[M]en 
believe that both judicial appointments and the hiring and promotion 
decisions made within law firms are merit-based." (citing NINTH CIRCUIT 
COURT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE 786-87 (1994))); Men, Women in 
Pharmaceutical Industry See "Glass Ceiling" Issues Differently, Says 
Healthcare Businesswomen's Study, Bus. WIRE, June 3, 1999 (describing a 
study of middle and upper level managers in the pharmaceutical industry that 
found that more than 50% of the men surveyed believed women had achieved 
parity with men within the industry, while more than 75% of the women 
believed the contrary). 
28. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Prior to the 
effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Duke Power "openly 
discriminated" against blacks, employing them only in the firm's labor 
department, where the highest paying positions paid less than the lowest 
paying jobs in the white-only departments of the company. I d. at 426-27. 
29. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 
413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting newspapers from 
carrying ''help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated columns). 
30. See infra Part I. C. (discussing the reality of workplace discrimination). 
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prove their merit."31 Different outcomes caused by differences 
in talent and hard work do not threaten the American belief in 
a fair and just system. 
According to the meritocracy myth, then, differences in 
outcome result not from· discrimination but from merit. Those 
who succeed deserve to do so because they are more talented 
and they work harder than their colleagues. Support for this 
belief is found in a study by James Kluegel of white Americans' 
beliefs about the reasons for the continuing gap in 
socioeconomic status between white and black Americans. 
Almost 31% of white Americans believe that the black-white 
socioeconomic gap is due solely to individual differences 
between the races: either differences in innate ability to learn 
or differences in motivation to succeed.32 Almost 65% of white 
Americans base the black-white socioeconomic gap, in part, on 
individual failings, like lack of motivation or ability.33 What is 
interesting is that even among those white Americans who, in 
part, attribute a structural reason, such as discrimination or 
educational opportunities, for the existence of the black-white 
socioeconomic gap, there is only weak support for programs to 
achieve racial equality.34 
[W]e seem to have reached an era of stable, comfortable acceptance by 
whites of the black-white. economic gap. As long as white Americans 
blame blacks for their economic condition, they have reason to oppose 
31. OSPINA, supra note 20, at 16 (footnote omitted). 
32. See James R. Kluegel, Trends in Whites' Explanations of the Black-
White Gap in Socioeconomic Status, 1977-1989, 55 AM. Soc. REV. 512, 517 tbl. 
3 (1990). In 1988-89, 10.1% of white Americans identified innate ability to 
learn as the reason for the black-white gap, while 20.4% said that motivation 
was the reason for the black-white differential in socioeconomic status. Id. 
The survey asked respondents to explain why blacks, on average, "have worse 
jobs, income, and housing than white people." Id. at 514. Respondents could 
select from four responses, two of which (answers B and D) identified the 
individual as the locus of blame for differences in socioeconomic status. 
Answer B stated that differences result "[b]ecause most blacks have less in-
born ability to learn." Id. (emphasis in original omitted). Answer D said that 
differences result "[b]ecause most blacks just don't have the motivation or will 
power to pull themselves out of poverty." Id. (emphasis in original omitted). 
33. Id. at 517. 
34. See id. at 520-21; see also Steven A. Tuch & Lee Sigelman, Race, 
Class, and Black-White Differences in Social Policy Views, in UNDERSTANDING 
PUBLIC OPINION 37, 48 tbl.3-3 (Barbara Norrander & Clyde Wilcox eds., 1997) 
(indicating that fifty percent of white Americans do not believe it is the 
business of government to ensure fair treatment in the workplace for black 
Americans). 
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[) policies [to improve the economic status of black Americans], or to 
withhold support for them in their private actions.35 
597 
This reluctance to support policies to achieve racial equality 
suggests that the majority of white Americans, even those who 
attribute differences in outcomes, in part, to structural forces, 
place most of the blame for the socioeconomic gap on the 
individual failings of black Americans. 
This focus on individual failings is a centerpiece of the 
meritocracy myth. Failure, in terms of losing jobs or 
promotions, results from individual shortcomings, not systemic 
flaws in selection procedures. Personal shortcomings, in terms 
of talent, education, effort, or desire, explain the differences in 
workplace success between white men, on the one hand, and 
blacks and women, on the other. CEOs claim that a shortage of 
qualified black men, not discrimination, explains the small 
number of black men in senior management positions in the 
United States. 36 A majority of white Americans believe that 
economic disparities between blacks and whites result, in part, 
from differences in innate ability and motivation. 37 For some 
white male managers, charges of racism are covers for "people 
of color [to] hide behind" in order to disguise poor 
performan,ce.38 Race and sex do not prevent success. "[A]nyone 
can make it to the top . . . if they're willing to put in the 
effort."39 
As for the progress of women in the workplace, one 
commentator claims that the innate superiority of men at 
construction work, not sex discrimination, accounts for the 
small number of women who hold jobs in construction.40 Most 
CEOs discount the role of discrimination in the progress of 
women towards upper-level management. They believe that 
35. Kluegel, supra note 32, at 524. 
36. GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 59. 
37. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35; see also L.A. Rollins, 
Affirmative Action-Equality Is a Myth, SEATTLE TIMES, March 14, 1998, at 
All (Letters to the Editor) ("[E]conomic inequalities between blacks and 
whites are not due solely and exclusively to racism .... '[E) quality' is a myth, 
and ... people will never, ever be equal."). 
38. Nancie Zane, Interrupting Historical Patterns: Bridging Race and 
Gender Gaps Between Senior White Men and Other Organizational Groups, in 
OFF WlllTE: READINGS ON RACE, POWER, AND SOCIETY 343, 346 (Michelle Fine 
et al. eds., 1997). 
39. Id. at 345. 
40. Andy Rooney, Men Are Better at Some Jobs Than Women, BUFFALO 
NEWS, Oct. 4, 1998, at 3H. 
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the glass ceiling no longer exists for women.41 Instead, they 
claim that women do not figure prominently in the upper 
echelons of management because they lack quantitative skills, 
will not work long hours, and are not as committed to their 
careers as are their male counterparts.42 Thus, the meritocracy 
myth attributes differences in success within the workplace to 
the choices that women make and to the role that inherent 
capabilities play in the selection of the most qualified candidate 
to perform thejob.43 
The myth's focus on individual talent and hard work as the 
sole determinants of success in the workplace plays itself out in 
the debate over affirmative action. Affirmative action is viewed 
as a threat to the meritocracy because it permits the hiring and 
promotion of "less qualified" blacks and women. 44 The 
41. See GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 145; see also Preston 
McHenry, For Women, Reverse Discrimination Worse, COMPUTERWORLD, July 
19, 1999, at 33 (Letters to the Editor) ("As an executive in IT for 30 years ... I 
have observed most human behaviors that can affect IT job performance. Sex 
discrimination is among the rarest of these."). 
42. See GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 151. 
43. See RHODE, supra note 22, at 10 ("[A] common view is that women's 
choices and capabilities explain women's disadvantages."); Roger Clegg, 
Democrats' Comparable Worth Bill Does Not Fight Real Gender 
Discrimination, Imposes an Unnecessary Burden on Employers, and Interferes 
with the Free Market, LEGAL TIMES, July 19, 1999, at 17 ("The reason for any 
remaining disparities is not discrimination, but the different choices made by 
men and women about the jobs and hours they work."). 
44. See, e.g., VmGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOw? THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
WOMEN 278 (1998) ("The nonwhite or nonmale candidate is perceived at the 
outset as having fewer qualifications and therefore as less deserving than the 
white male; affirmative action is needed in order to compensate for the 
candidate's poor qualifications."); Linda David, Quasim Not Qualified, 
SEATTLE TIMES, June 12, 1999, at A15 (Letters to the Editor) ("Lyle Quasim 
obviously is not qualified and most probably would not have gotten the job if 
not for affirmative action. Happens all the time."); Charles Kluepfel, 
Affirmative Action Has Its Victims; Preparatory Schools?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 1998, at 20 (Letters to the Editor) (arguing that white students without 
connections are hurt by affirmative action, which benefits "some blacks with 
lower merit"); Joseph W. Morgan, Call a Halt to Affirmative Action, ARiz. BUS. 
GAZETTE, May 6, 1999, at 5 (Letters to the Editor) ("The only fair policy is a 
policy that looks at merit alone. This is the only policy that is fair to everyone 
and does not lower standards."); John G. Nash, Affirmative Action Is a Form of 
Racial Prejudice, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 27, 1999, at 17 A (Letters to the 
Editor) ("[Affirmative action] has accomplished little other than lowering 
academic standards, reducing the quality of products and services provided by 
agencies and offices forced to hire unqualified applicants and precipitating 
racial hatred."); Thomas S. Overbeck, Affirmative Action-I-200 Renders What 
Is Just, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at B7 (Letters to the Editor) 
("Preferential hiring promotes the idea that a minority is hired because of 
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language used to oppose affirmative action-standards, 
qualifications, and merit-highlights the firmly held belief that 
current methods of hiring and promotion are fair and 
objective.45 
Acknowledging that race discrimination still poses a 
significant barrier to employment opportunity "challenges the 
legitimacy of the broader system from which whites' relative 
privilege derives."46 Admitting that race and sex 
discrimination still play a significant role in hiring and 
promotion decisions means accepting that merit alone does not 
determine success. This undermines not only the entire 
meritocracy myth, but also "the generalized belief in an 
inherently just world."47 It is easier to believe that the "other," 
whether a black person or a woman, lacks the education, skills, 
talent, or motivation to succeed than to believe that success is 
determined, at least in part, by accidents of birth: having white 
skin or male sex characteristics. 
C. THE REALITY OF WORKPLACE OPPORTUNITY 
Disturbing disparities emerge when aggregate data on the 
workplace success of white men is compared with that of blacks 
and women. First, jobs in the U.S. labor market are segregated 
both by race and by sex.48 Occupational race and sex 
segregation is not a neutral phenomenon; blacks and women 
feel its effects disproportionately. "[T]he continued segregation 
of blacks in low-paid, low-skill occupations ensures blacks' 
continuing economic disadvantage."49 Occupational sex 
segregation also disadvantages women: lower pay, the absence 
their [sic) gender or race and not because of their [sic) qualifications and 
merit."). 
45. See OSPINA, supra note 20, at 14 (discussing the "strongly ingrained 
ideology of merit in the mind of the average American worker"); VALIAN, supra 
note 44, at 278 (writing that misunderstandings about affirmative action 
stem, in part, from "our faith that hiring procedures are normally meritocratic, 
so that the best person gets the job"). 
46. Bobo & Kl.uegel, supra note 23, at 459. 
47. OSPINA, supra note 20, at 13 (citations omitted). 
48. Elissa L. Perry et al., Explaining Gender-Based Selection Decisions: A 
Synthesis of Contextual and Cognitive Approaches, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 786 
(1994); BARBARA F. RESKIN & PATRICIA A. ROOS, JOB QUEUES, GENDER 
QUEUES 3-7 (1990). 
49. RESKIN & Roos, supra note 48, at 7. 
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of benefits, and fewer chances for promotion characterize 
traditionally female jobs. 50 
Second, while white men comprise approximately 43% of 
the U.S. work force,51 in Corporate America, they are 
disproportionately represented at the highest levels of 
management. Almost 97% of senior managers at Fortune 1000 
industrial and Fortune 500 service firms are white.52 Between 
95% and 97% of senior managers of Fortune 1500 firms are 
male, 53 and minority women comprise a mere 5% of those 3% to 
5% of senior management positions held by women.54 Even 
holding constant educational achievement, white men account 
for a disproportionate share of executive, administrative, and 
management jobs. 
[W]hite men have 68 percent more of the executive, administrative, 
and managerial positions than should be expected . . . -all things 
being equal. . . . [W]hite men are overrepresented in top positions 
regardless to [sic] educational levels. Black women are the most 
underrepresented group in executive, administrative, and managerial 
occupations for each educational level, when compared to Black men 
and white non-Hispanic men and women.55 
White men are also disproportionately represented among the 
ranks of Fortune 500 CEOs (95%),56 daily newspaper editors 
(90%),57 law firm partners (85%),58 tenured professors (between 
70%59 and 85%60), and TV news directors (77%).61 As of 1993, 
50. Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19 ANN. REV. Soc. 
241, 242 (1993); Deborah J. Vagins, Occupational Segregation and the Male-
Worker-Norm: Challenging Objective Work Requirements Under Title VII, 18 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 79, 80-81 (1996). 
51. GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 12 (based on 1990 U.S. 
Census data). Other authors use lower figures for the percentage of men in 
the U.S. population. See David Gates, White Male Paranoia, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 
29, 1993, at 48 (stating that, as of 1993, white men comprised 39.2% of the 
U.S. population); Benokraitis, supra note 25, at 5 (stating that white men 
comprised 33% of the U.S. population in the mid-1990s). The differences are 
due to changes in population over time, as well as the fact that the U.S. 
Census Data is based on the percentage of white men in the U.S. labor force. 
The other figures measure white men as a percentage of the total population, 
not the U.S. labor force. 
52. GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 9. 
53. Id. at 12. 
54. Id. at 10. 
55. Id. at 74. 
56. Benokraitis, supra note 25, at 5. 
57. Gates, supra note 51, at 48. 
58. Benokraitis, supra note 25, at 5. 
59. Gates, supra note 51, at 48. 
60. Benokraitis, supra note 25, at 5. 
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86% of federal courts of appeals judges and 88% of federal 
district court judges were men. 62 
The disparities also extend to pay between black and white 
employees. Black male executives, administrators, and 
managers who hold professional degrees earn 79% of what their 
white male counterparts, in the same positions with the same 
degrees, earn.63 Black women fare even worse; they earn 60% 
of the average salary for a similarly situated white male 
executive, administrator, or manager holding the same 
degree. 64 One study found that as the percentage of black 
workers increased at a firm, black workers' wages declined.65 
The race effect, however, was one-sided. Researchers found 
that the increase in percentage of black workers at the firm 
benefited white workers; their wages increased as a result of 
the change in the firm's racial composition.66 
Aggregate differences in pay also exist between men and 
women. A 1990 survey of 3664 MBA students from the top 
twenty business schools found that in the first year after 
graduation men earned an average of $61,400 while their 
female classmates earned an average of $54,749.67 A study by 
Linda Stroh, Jeanne Brett, and Anne Riley of 1029 female and 
male managers from twenty Fortune 500 companies found that 
sex, not educational achievement,, geographic mobility, or 
industry differences, accounted for 2% of the salary differential 
between female and male managers. 68 When Stroh and her 
61. Gates, supra note 51, at 48. 
62. Report of the Special Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit Task 
Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEO. L.J. 1657, 1678 n.7 (1996). 
63. GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 80; cf. Mark Cassell & Amy 
Hanauer, Economy Booms, But Wages Fall; Dropouts Suffer Most, Highly 
Educated Avoid Income Erosion, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 8, 1999, at 9B 
(stating that wages of black men in Ohio have dropped 28% in the past 20 
years). 
64. GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 80; see also Cassell & 
Hanauer, supra note 63, at 98 (reporting that over the past twenty years in 
Ohio, the real wages of white women have increased, albeit slightly, while the 
real wages of black women have dropped). 
65. Barbara F. Reskin et al., The Determinants and Consequences of 
Workplace Sex and Race Composition, 25 ANN. REV. Soc. 335, 353 (1999) 
(citing William J. Carrington & Kenneth R. Troske, Interfirm Segregation and 
the Black/White Wage Gap, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 231 (1998)). 
66. Id. 
67. GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 13; see also Cassell & 
Hanauer, supra note 63 (stating that a gender pay gap still exists in Ohio). 
68. Linda K Stroh et al., All the Right Stuff: A Comparison of Female and 
Male Managers' Career Progression, 77 J. APP. PSYCHOL. 251, 254-57 (1992). 
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colleagues held constant the number of years that female and 
male managers had been in the work force and at their current 
firms, they found that the salaries of female managers had 
increased 54% during the five years prior to the study while the 
salaries of male managers had increased by 65% during that 
same time period.69 A more recent study of seventy-two female 
and male managers of a multinational financial services firm 
found that "the female executives received fewer stock options 
than the male executives, even after controlling for level of 
education, performance rating, and level in the management 
hierarchy .''7° 
If discrimination is a relic of the American past, what 
accounts for these disparities in position, power, and pay 
between blacks and women, on the one hand, and whites and 
men, on the other? The meritocracy myth posits that 
differences in talent, training, skill, and effort explain these 
differences in outcomes. A significant body of evidence, drawn 
from government reports and empirical studies, however, 
contradicts this basic assumption of the meritocracy myth. The 
research shows that the nature of discrimination in the 
workplace has changed. 
Traditional prejudice certainly has not disappeared.71 
"[R]esistance to minorities and women [on the job] can be 
severe, especially 'at the beginning' ... .''72 But, over the past 
forty years, the percentage of white Americans who adhere to 
overtly racist beliefs has declined significantly.73 With this 
69. Id. at 255. 
70. Karen S. Lyness & Donna E. Thompson, Aboue the Glass Ceiling? A 
Comparison of Matched Samples of Female and Male Executiues, 82 J. APP. 
PSYCHOL. 359, 371 (1997); see also Aaron Bernstein, Stock Options Bite Back, 
Bus. WK., June 14, 1999, at 50 (describing a sex discrimination lawsuit 
against West Group that alleged that the firm's chief executive officer offered 
male employees opportunities to participate in the firm's stock purchase 
program that were denied to similarly situated female employees). 
71. See, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 7, at 4 ("10%-15% of the 
white population still expresses the old-fashioned, overt form of bigotry."); 
Marie Cocco, Merchants of Hate Increase and Prosper, THE PLAIN DEALER, 
Mar. 8, 1999, at 7B (describing increase in hate groups); Carey Goldberg, 
Boston Settles Lawsuit by Harassed Minority Tenants, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 
1999, at A14 (reporting that the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) settled a 
lawsuit, brought by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and 
minority plaintiffs, charging "systemic discrimination" by the BHA for failing 
to stop racial harassment of minority tenants by white tenants). 
72. GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 59 (emphasis in original). 
73. See Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 23, at 443 (citing a steady decline 
since the 1940s in the percentage of white Americans "adher[ing] to Jim Crow 
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decline in overtly discriminatory beliefs, however, comes a 
concomitant belief that the playing field is now level for all 
players, regardless of race or sex. "Many white Americans now 
believe that since they are no longer racially prejudiced there 
are no barriers to opportunity for blacks."74 The problem lies in 
the meritocracy myth's definition of discrimination as 
traditional prejudice.75 The paradigmatic intentional race or 
sex discrimination case is based on a model of overt,76 
racism"); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 7, at 4 (explaining that whites are 
more accepting of and have less negative attitudes about blacks). 
74. Kluegel, supra note 32, at 513. 
75. See Richard D. Ashmore, The Problem of Intergroup Prejudice, in 
BARRY E. COLLINS & RICHARD D. AsHMORE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 246, 253 
(1970) ("Prejudice is a negative attitude toward a socially defined group and 
toward any person perceived to be a member of that group." (emphasis in 
original omitted)); Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Does White Racism Necessarily 
Mean Antiblackness? Aversive Racism and Prowhiteness, in OFF WHITE: 
READINGS ON RACE, POWER, AND SOCIETY, supra note 38, at 168 (noting that 
traditional definitions of prejudice involve negative feelings and beliefs). 
76. See, e.g., Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 236 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that a panel that had ranked a female plaintiff lower than a male 
candidate for promotion had "Iio history of discriminatory animus toward 
women"), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1243 (2000); Bullington v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 (lOth Cir. 1999) (affirming an order granting 
summary judgment to the employer on an applicant's sex and age 
discrimination claims, stating that there was "little merit in [plaintiffs] 
argument that United based its employment decisions on gender and age 
stereotypes" because "the record reveal[ed] little that could be construed as 
stereotyped assumptions about the qualifications, work habits, or personality 
traits offemale or older interviewees" (citation omitted)); Austin v. Apfel, No. 
CV-97-J-1741-S, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17483, at *17-18 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 14, 
1999) (granting summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiffs race 
and sex discrimination claims and noting that even though selecting official 
had "never received training on how to make selections for promotions, nor 
was he given any formal written criteria," plaintiff knew of no "incident which 
caused her to believe [the selecting official] would discriminate against 
someone because of his or her race" (citations omitted)); Romero v. Banco 
Popular de P.R., 35 F. Supp. 2d 195, 199 (D.P.R. 1999) (granting summary 
judgment to the employer on the plaintiffs claim of race and color 
discrimination and concluding that sworn statements of the plaintiffs 
supervisor and another retired bank official about unwritten rules at the bank 
about not promoting black candidates should concern management, but 
"fail[ed] to establish that the bank discriminated against [plaintifi] in 
particular"), affd in part, vacated in part, 212 F.3d 607 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(affirming the decision as to failure to promote and constructive termination 
claims, but remanding on a race-based harassment charge); cf. Byrnie v. Town 
of Cromwell Pub. Schs., 73 F. Supp. 2d 204, 215 (D. Conn. 1999) ("[The 
plaintifi] testified that there was nothing overt that led him to believe that 
there was age bias in the interview process." (citation omitted)); Ayan v. Cal. 
Teachers Ass'n., No. C97-4525 :MliP, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3810, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 25, 1999) (granting summary judgment to the employer on the 
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negative, 77 and conscious 78 action taken against a member of a 
protected group, such as a black man. Because the meritocracy 
plaintiffs' national origin claims, noting that "[i]n her deposition, [one of the 
plaintiffs] was repeatedly asked to recall specific instances exemplifying racial 
animus, ... [but could] recallD no specific instance of an employee using racial 
slurs or discriminatory comments regarding her national origin" (citations 
omitted)). 
The Texaco race discrimination case illustrates the prevailing concept of 
discrimination as overt bias. Until The New York Times broke the story of the 
secret tape recordings of Texaco executives allegedly referring to black 
employees as "fucking niggers" and "black jelly beans," the class action race 
discrimination lawsuit against Texaco received limited media attention. 
Alison Frankel, Tale of the Tapes, AM. LAw., Mar. 1997, at 64. The racial 
epithets, however, provided the "smoking gun" for the race discrimination 
plaintiffs-"real" evidence of conscious, overt, and negative bias against black 
Texaco employees. The story spread like wildfire. Texaco hired an expert to 
enhance the audio on the tapes. Id. at 66. The expert concluded that the 
Texaco executive on the tape, in the course of discussing Hanukkah and 
Kwanzaa, actually said "poor St. Nicholas," not "fucking niggers." Id. 
The fall-out from Texaco's disclosures of the alleged actual content of the 
tape recordings was not surprising. The "smoking gun" theory of 
discrimination requires overt and conscious bias, and the tapes provided that 
evidence. Without it, some commentators questioned whether racism actually 
existed at Texaco. See id. 
To the frustration of civil rights leaders, debate hinged on whether 
The New York Times had been duped by plaintiffs' lawyers, and 
whether, since no one actually said "fucking niggers" on the tapes, the 
transcripts showed high-level racism at all .... 
. . . To reduce the question of race discrimination at Texaco to 
whether its former treasurer said "nigger" or "Nicholas" is absurd .... 
The story of the Texaco tapes is irresistible .... But what that 
story misses is how willingly we sidestepped a discussion of the 
merits of the suit. When this case was just about African-Americans 
making serious claims of discrimination at one of the biggest 
companies in the country, no one paid much attention .... Only when 
the tapes surfaced did the world take notice-and then, only of what 
was on the tapes .... 
But if there's no tape in the next case, will anyone care? 
I d. at 66-67. 
77. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring) ("[D]ecisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an 
illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision." (emphasis added)); Gaertner 
et al., supra note 75, at 168 (stating that "modern, subtle forms of bias ... may 
be characterized by a significant component of prowhite (i.e., pro-ingroup) 
attitudes" as opposed to primarily anti-black attitudes); Trina Grillo & 
Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of 
Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other Isms), in 
STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED 85, 91 (1996) ("'Race and sex, 
moreover, become significant only when they operate to explicitly 
disadvantage the victims; because the privileging of whiteness or maleness is 
implicit, it is generally not perceived at all.'" (quoting Kimberle Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
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myth identifies discrimination as traditional forms of overt 
bias, most white Americans believe discrimination no longer 
exists. A similar phenomenon operates with regard to sex 
discrimination on the job. "What explains this gap between 
popular perceptions and concrete data on gender inequality? 
Part of the explanation lies with selective perception. Men 
often deny bias because they fail to recognize it.''79 
The other part of the explanation, however, lies with the 
privilege of belonging to the dominant group. "[M]embers of 
dominant groups assume that their perceptions are the 
pertinent perceptions ... .''80 Defining discrimination in the 
traditional lexicon of prejudice, as conscious, overt, and 
negative bias, relieves the dominant group from responsibility 
for examining the privileges that obtain by virtue of their race, 
sex, or both. 81 Whatever the motivation behind the failure to 
recognize the continued operation of race and sex 
discrimination in the American workplace, the failure itself 
results from an outmoded and limited definition of 
discrimination. 
Discrimination today is more subtle and difficult to 
identify. Studies show that people often are unable to 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 150-51)); John Dovidio, "Aversive" Racism and the Need for 
Affirmative Action, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 25, 1997, at A60 ("[Whites] 
frequently express their bias indirectly, by favoring whites rather than 
discriminating against blacks and members of other minority groups."). 
78. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 ("In saying that gender 
played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we 
asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if 
we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the 
applicant or employee was a woman." (footnote omitted)); Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (stating that disparate 
treatment cases require plaintiff to prove defendant's "discriminatory intent or 
motive"); SUSAN D. CLAYTON & FAYE J. CROSBY, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 39 (1992) ("Equal opportunity policies operate as if 
intentions were all that mattered, placing too much faith in the conscious 
control of behavior."); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: 
A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1167 (1995) ("In the stories told by 
disparate treatment caselaw, there is no discrimination without an invidiously 
motivated actor."); Dovidio, supra note 77 (noting preference for affirmative 
action because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent). 
79. RHODE, supra note 22, at 3. 
80. Grillo & Wildman, supra note 77, at 91. 
81. See RHODE, supra note 22, at 3-4; Bobo & Kluegel, supra note 23, at 
459; Grillo & Wildman, supra note 77, at 90-91. 
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recognize discrimination on a case-by-case basis. 82 A study 
involving 136 MBA students at Northwestern University found 
that the students were significantly more likely to find pay 
disparities in a hypothetical company when those disparities 
were conspicuous, for example where women with higher rank 
or more years of experience were paid less than men in the 
same department. 83 Unless an employer expresses outright 
hostility to a particular group, people explain disparities 
between groups by looking for individual, not systemic, 
reasons.84 Thus, people conclude that an employer who pays a 
male employee more than a female employee does so not 
because of bias, but because the male employee has more 
education or because the female employee is less dedicated to 
the job. It is only when cumulative employment data is 
available that people are better able to identify discrimination 
as the reason for significant disparities between black and 
white, and male and female, employees. 85 
It is this changing nature of discrimination that makes it 
hard to identify. Administrators at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology acknowledged that they had been 
blinded to the effects of sex discrimination at MIT's School of 
Science because what they observed did not fit their traditional 
ideas of what discrimination looked like. 
How else might we explain what happened to the senior women 
faculty in Science? .... [A] critical part of the explanation lies in our 
collective ignorance. We must accept that what happened to the 
tenured women faculty in the School of Science is what discrimination 
is. . . . But we, including for a long time the women faculty 
themselves, were slow to recognize and understand this for several 
reasons. First, it did not look like what we thought discrimination 
looked like . ... [G]ender discrimination turns out to take many forms 
and many of these are not simple to recognize. Women faculty who 
lived the experience came to see the pattern of difference in how their 
male and female colleagues were treated and gradually they realized 
that this was discrimination. But when they spoke up, no one heard 
them, believing that each problem could be explained alternatively by 
its "special circumstances."86 
82. See CLAYTON & CROSBY, supra note 78, at 76-79. 
83. Christel G. Rutte et al., Organization of Information and the Detection 
of Gender Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 226, 226-29 (1994). 
84. See CLAYTON & CROSBY, supra note 78, at 79. 
85. See id. at 76-79; Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 7, at 17 ("'f the 
decisions that people make are biased in systematic ways, they will have 
biased outcomes for minorities and nonminorities."); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 48-70 (providing such cumulative data). 
86. A Study on the Status of Women Faculty in Science at MIT, MIT FAC. 
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As the MIT Report suggests, most Americans fail to recognize 
discrimination because it does not "look like what we [think] 
discrimination [should] look[] like."87 It is a mistake, however, 
to then conclude that discrimination no longer affects the 
employment opportunities ofblacks and women. 
Numerous studies demonstrate that race and sex subtly 
influence our evaluations of performance, even when individual 
candidates possess equal objective qualifications. For example, 
one study found that white evaluators judge white candidates 
more favorably than equally qualified black candidates. 88 
Researchers recruited college students to help make admissions 
decisions for the students' university. 89 Students received 
profiles of poorly qualified, moderately qualified, and highly 
qualified black and white applicants.90 Photos were attached to 
applications in order to determine the impact of race on the 
students' evaluations.91 The researchers found that poorly 
qualified black and white applicants received similarly low 
scores from the students.92 But racial bias emerged in 
students' evaluations of moderately and highly qualified 
applicants. 
[Participants] showed some bias when they evaluated the moderately 
qualified white applicant slightly higher than [the] comparable black 
candidate. Discrimination against the black applicant was most 
apparent, however, when the applicants were highly qualified .... 
Although white participants evaluated the highly qualified black 
applicant very positively, they judged the highly qualified white 
applicant, with exactly the same credentials, as even better. 93 
The overall evaluation of the black and white applicants was 
comprised of a number of individual items, some objective, such 
as grade point average, and others subjective. The researchers 
discovered that bias increased "[t]he less directly related the 
NEWSL., Mar. 1999, at 12 [hereinafter :MIT REPORT] (emphasis in original); see 
also CLAYTON & CROSBY, supra note 78, at 79 ("People may also have ideas 
about what discrimination 'looks like.' They may feel, for example, that 
discrimination only occurs when there is the intention to discriminate, or 
when a man earns much more than an equally qualified woman."). 
87. :MIT REPORT, supra note 86, at 12 (emphasis in original); see also 
CLAYTON & CROSBY, supra note 78, at 79. 
88. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 7, at 17-18. 
89. ld. 
90. ld. 
9L ld. 
92. ld. 
93. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
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item was to the transcript information."94 Subjective 
evaluation criteria, then, provided the white students with the 
ability to make facially neutral decisions that ultimately were 
motivated by racial bias, a finding consistent with earlier 
studies of the impact of subjective criteria on whites' evaluation 
of blacks' work performance.95 
Researchers at the University of Minnesota found that a 
supervisor's race significantly affected the subjective 
performance evaluations given to black employees in two large 
samples of civilian and military employers. 96 The researchers 
found that white employees received ''virtually identical 
ratings" from both black and white supervisors.97 But white 
supervisors' evaluations of black employees were significantly 
lower than black supervisors' evaluations of black employees.98 
Two other studies by John Dovidio and Samuel Gaertner 
highlight the changing nature of white racism. In both studies, 
white participants did not demonstrate traditional signs of 
overt bias towards blacks. Yet white participants consistently 
rated white candidates as superior to equally situated black 
candidates. 
One study paired the participant, a white male 
undergraduate, with either a black or white male partner.99 
The researchers described the partner as either the 
participant's subordinate or supervisor for the assigned task.IOO 
The researchers also informed the participant that his partner 
possessed either higher or lower intellectual ability than the 
participant with regard to the assigned task.IOl Researchers 
discovered that the white male participants helped white male 
supervisors more frequently than they helped white male 
subordinates.102 But the white male participants did not help 
black male supervisors more frequently than they helped black 
male subordinates.103 In order to account for this discrepancy 
94. ld. 
95. See id. 
96. Paul R. Sackett & Cathy L.Z. DuBois, Rater-Ratee Race Effects on 
Performance Evaluation, 76 J. APP. PSYCHOL. 873 (1991). 
97. Id. at 875. 
98. ld. at 876 (finding that ratings of white supervisors were 0.02 to 0.10 
of a standard deviation lower than those given by black supervisors). 
99. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 7, at 19-20. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. ld. 
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in helping behavior, the researchers examined the white male 
participants' post-experiment evaluations of their partners.104 
Although participants' ratings indicated that they accepted high-
ability white partners as being somewhat more intelligent than 
themselves, the ratings revealed that participants described even 
high-ability black partners as significantly less intelligent than 
themselves. Blacks may be regarded as intelligent, but not as 
intelligent as whites.105 
In the second study, participants reacted to a sketch of a 
black or white person quickly flashed onto a computer 
screen.106 The screen then flashed up a trait, either positive or 
negative.107 Researchers recorded both the traits identified and 
the reaction time of participants.108 As expected, participants 
took longer to identify positive traits with the black computer 
sketches.I09 This result conformed to the findings of other 
research studies: whites' attitudes towards other whites are 
more positive than their attitudes towards blacks.110 But the 
researchers also found that white participants more easily 
associated negative traits with the black, as opposed to the 
white, computer image.111 "There were a considerable number 
of participants who appeared low in prejudice on the self-report 
measure but who were racially biased on the measure of 
unconscious attitudes .... "112 Thus, measuring discrimination 
on the basis of professed racial prejudice significantly 
understates · the impact of subtle and even unconscious 
racism.113 
A similar pattern of subtle and, at times, unconscious 
sexism emerges in the studies on sex discrimination. As with 
race discrimination, some researchers suspect that professed 
beliefs about gender equality actually mask more subtle 
discriminatory beliefs about the sexes.l14 In a recent study, 
104. Id. at 20. 
105. Id. at 20. 
106. See id. at 15-16. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 16. 
110. See id. at 8-14. 
111. Id. at 16. 
112. Id. 
113. See id. at 13 ("[W]e believe that many of the nationwide surveys 
overrepresent the racially tolerant response."). 
114. Janet K Swim et al., Sexism and Racism: Old-Fashioned and Modern 
Prejudices, 68 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 199, 200 (1995). To test this theory, 
researchers developed two scales: one measuring "Old-Fashioned Sexism" and 
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researchers at Ohio State University asked participants to 
identify which of ninety-two different traits characterized a 
successful middle manager, a successful male middle manager, 
and a successful female middle manager.I15 The researchers 
found that male and female participants identified similar 
traits as characteristic of the typical middle manager .116 Male 
and female participants "also largely agree[d] on descriptions of 
male managers ... view[ing] male managers in a positive 
light."117 Only in the descriptions of female managers did 
significant disagreement arise between male and female 
participants. 
The discrepancies between the descriptions of female managers given 
by male subjects and by female subjects are, in a word, extreme. 
Male subjects generally were less likely than female subjects to 
describe female managers as ambitious, authoritative, competent, 
direct, firm, intelligent, objective, sophisticated, or well informed. 
Male subjects were more likely than female subjects to describe 
female managers as bitter, likely to dawdle and procrastinate, 
deceitful, easily influenced, frivolous, hasty, nervous, passive, 
quarrelsome, reserved, shy, having a strong need for social 
acceptance, timid, uncertain, and vulgar. 118 
This research suggests that male supervisors, who carry 
negative beliefs about the typical female manager, will be less 
likely to evaluate individual female managers in a positive 
light. Individual male managers benefit from association with 
a positive archetype; association with a negative archetype 
harms individual female managers. 
A much-publicized study presented to the National Bureau 
of Economic Research by Claudia Goldin, a Harvard economist, 
and Cecilia Rouse, of Princeton, reveals how subtle sex 
discrimination affects a woman's chances of landing a job with 
the other "Modern Sexism." The Old-Fashioned Sexism scale contained 
statements such as "Women are generally not as smart as men." Id. app. B at 
212. The Modern Sexism scale included statements like "Discrimination 
against women is no longer a problem in the United States." Id. They tested 
the scales on two large samples of college-age students and found that those 
who rated high on Modern Sexism "were more likely to overestimate the 
percentage of women in male-dominated jobs than were those who were low in 
Modern Sexism." Id. at 205. In addition, those who rated high on the Modern 
Sexism scale were more likely to attribute sex segregation in jobs to biological 
differences between the sexes, rather than to structural causes, such as 
discrimination. I d. at 208. 
115. Deal & Stevenson, supra note 7, at 293. 
116. Id. at 298. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
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a major orchestra.119 Goldin and Rouse studied the effect of 
blind auditions, in which a musician auditions behind a screen, 
on orchestral hiring of female musicians. "[W]hen musicians 
are judged purely on their merits, women get a huge break. 
Using blind auditions increases by 50% the chances that a 
woman will advance from the preliminary round and nearly 
triples her chances of being selected from among the 
finalists .... "120 The Goldin and Rouse study demonstrates 
that sex, not merit alone, affects hiring decisions. 
A Prime-Time Live broadcast from 1993 reveals the subtle 
ways in which men and women are steered into different jobs, 
which can then affect subsequent opportunities for 
promotion.I21 Prime-Time Live followed one man and one 
woman, who had the same basic qualifications, as they applied 
for the same advertised positions. The differences in treatment 
were startling. "The man got offers for managerial positions 
paying up to $500 per week. The woman got typing tests and 
information about receptionist and secretarial positions paying 
about $240."122 Employers denied discriminating against the 
female applicant. Instead, they explained the differential job 
offers as an attempt to fit the applicant with the position: men 
are better suited to field management positions and women to 
receptionist positions.123 
Other studies confirm the anecdotal results of the Prime-
Time Live experiment: gender stereotypes about occupations, in 
part, shape employment opportunity.124 The Glass Ceiling 
Commission found that sex stereotyping of jobs "steer[s] 
[women] into jobs that limit possibilities for their career 
growth."125 For example, a 1995 Food Marketing Institute 
study found that sex and race stereotyping affected the jobs 
119. Joseph McLellan, Do UnSeen Musicians Get Fairer Hearings?; 
Professors See Link Between 'Blind' Auditions and Rise in Orchestras' Female 
Hires, WASH. POST, July 13, 1997, at G16; Jonathan Marshall, "Blind" 
Auditions Putting Discrimination on Center Stage, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 
10, 1997, at Bl. 
120. Marshall, supra note 119. 
121. See RHODE, supra note 22, at 146. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. See Judd & Oswald, supra note 7, at 474-75 (discussing various 
studies of the effect of sex and gender on employment desirability and 
reporting results of authors' hiring study showing interactive effects of sex and 
gender on employment desirability rating for different occupations). 
125. GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 153. 
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offered to women and racial minorities.I26 Because the jobs 
traditionally occupied by women in the supermarket industry 
rarely lead to leadership positions, initial placement, based on 
sex stereotyping, affects women's long-term opportunity within 
the industry.127 
The Glass Ceiling Commission confirms these studies' 
findings: 
Despite the growing concern of corporate leaders who consider 
diversity at the managerial and decisionmaking levels to be an 
important issue impacting their company's bottom line, significant 
barriers continue to exist at various levels within organizations and 
are experienced differently by different ethnic and racial groups. 
These barriers impede the advancement of qualified minorities and 
women . 
. . . mn the private sector, equally qualified and similarly situated 
citizens are being denied equal access to advancement into senior-
level management on the basis of gender, race, or ethnicity. At the 
highest levels of corporations the promise of reward for preparation 
and pursuit of excellence is not equally available to members of all 
groups. 128 
The Commission concluded that merit alone does not account 
for the serious disparities in income and position in the 
American workplace. Instead, race and sex still play an 
important role in achieving success within the American 
workplace. 
II. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE DEMISE OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CASE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that Elena, a black woman, applies for a position 
as a bank teller. Elena is qualified for the job, but the bank 
offers the position to Fiona, a white woman. If Elena suspects 
that her race played a role in the bank's employment decision, 
she must fit her claim into one of the legally recognized 
paradigms for proving race discrimination. For plaintiffs who 
are fired or denied a job or promotion, that usually means 
126. Stuart Silverstein, In Supermarkets' Executive Department, A Lack of 
Variety, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1999, at Cl. 
127. Id. ("'Women usually work in cashier, office and customer service 
roles, and in specialty departments-which seldom lead to major leadership 
opportunities.'" (quoting 1995 Food Marketing Institute report)). 
128. GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra note 24, at 9-11. 
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asserting a claim using disparate treatment rather than 
disparate impact analysis.J29 A plaintiff can make out a case of 
disparate treatment using either direct130 or circumstantial 
evidence of discrimination.131 
129. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 425 (1999) ("[I]ndividual 
claims of disparate treatment dominate employment discrimination actions."). 
Disparate impact analysis "inherently requires that plaintiffs or their 
attorneys look to aggregate hiring or firing statistics, which are not available 
to potential plaintiffs in the ordinary course of events." Ian Ayres & Peter 
Siegelman, Symposium: The Changing Workplace: The Q-Word as Red 
Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1494 (1996). Moreover, even in disparate treatment cases 
based on circumstantial evidence, courts reject statistical samples that are too 
small, see, e.g., Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d 888, 893 
(D. Kan. 1999) (granting summary judgment and rejecting the plaintiffs 
statistical evidence concerning the eight applicants for position as probative of 
race discrimination because "a sample of eight is too small to provide reliable 
results" (citations omitted)); Harris v. Parker Hannifin Corp., No. 1:97-CV-
254-B-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13526, at *9 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 24, 1998) 
(granting summary judgment to the employer and rejecting the plaintiffs 
statistical evidence because the sample was "too small to be relied upon as 
evidence of pretext" (citation omitted)), or not based on "similarly situated" 
employees, see, e.g., Kennedy v. Quaker Oats Co., No. 97-CV-72094-DT, 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15340, at *26-29 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 1998) (granting 
summary judgment on an age discrimination claim and rejecting statistical 
evidence that would be presented by the terminated employee's expert because 
the expert's statistical analysis did not confine itself to "similarly situated" 
employees who were terminated). Thus, it may prove impossible for plaintiffs 
applying for jobs in small companies or for high-level positions, where the size 
of the relevant qualified ]Jool is small, to construct a successful disparate 
impact case even if they do have access to management firing, hiring, and 
promotion statistics. 
130. Direct evidence cases include those in which the sole motive for the 
employment decision was discrimination and mixed-motive cases in which 
discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment decision. See 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, REVISED ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DIS'PARATE TREATMENT THEORY § 
III.B. (1992) [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE]. . 
131. See, e.g., Bell v. EPA, No. 97 C 6349, 1999 U.S. bist. LEXIS 16445, at 
*7-8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 1999) ("To avoid summary judgment, Plaintiffs [can] 
present either direct evidence of discrimination, such as a 'smoking gun' 
admission, or follow the familiar three-step burden-shifting method set forth 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." (citations omitted)); Bauer v. Metz 
Baking Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901-02 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 4, 1999) (holding that 
plaintiff can prove employment discrimination using either direct or indirect 
evidence of discrimination); Hagen v. Beauticontrol Cosmetics, Inc., No. 3:98-
CV-1199-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9998, at *13-14 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 1999) 
("Adducing direct evidence of discrimination is not the only way for [the 
plaintifi1 to avoid summary judgment. Because direct evidence of 
discrimination is so rare, courts have devised an indirect or inferential method 
of proving invidious discrimination." (citation omitted)). 
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Suppose that the bank informs Elena that she did not 
receive the job because "blacks have weak mathematical skills." 
This comment provides direct evidence of discrimination: the 
bank's bad intent and a causal connection to the prohibited 
activity, failure to hire based on race. 132 But direct evidence of 
discrimination is rare.133 Employers seldom provide plaintiffs 
Some courts state that plaintiffs can make out a disparate treatment case 
using direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence of discrimination. See 
Lockett v. Fort James Corp., No. 98-0612-CB-M, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17017, 
at *13 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 4, 1999); Ayan v. Heisinger, No. C97-4525 MHP, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3810, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1999). But the courts treat 
statistical evidence as a subset of circumstantial evidence, employing the 
McDonnell Douglas framework in any disparate treatment case in which the 
plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination. 
132. See EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 130, § liLA. ("Direct evidence of 
discriminatory motive may be any written or verbal policy or statement made 
by a[n employer] that on its face demonstrates a bias against a protected 
group and is linked to the complained of adverse action."); see also Haas v. 
Betz Labs., Inc., No. 97-56560, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14102, at *3 (9th Cir. 
June 23, 1999) (holding that, in an age discrimination case, plaintiff Haas 
showed pretext directly by offering statements by the decision maker that he 
preferred hiring younger workers because they could "work longer hours" and 
"[had] some desire for earning money, such as saving to buy a house"); 
Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 
1998) ("Direct evidence of discriminatory intent in pregnancy discrimination 
cases generally is in the form of an admission by a supervisor or decision 
maker that the employee was suspended because she was pregnant." (citation 
omitted)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 870 (1998); Carter v. Three Springs 
Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998) ("'Direct evidence 
relates to actions or statements of an employer reflecting a discriminatory or 
retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation complained 
of by the employee.'" (quoting Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1555 
(11th Cir. 1990))); Hagen, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9998, at *8-9 ("Direct 
evidence is evidence that, without requiring a fact finder to make any 
inferences or presumptions, proves that a person engaged in unlawful 
discrimination." (citations omitted)). 
133. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 
711, 716 (1983) ("There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the 
employer's mental processes."); Rutherford v. Harris County, 197 F.3d 173, 
184 n.11 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Had this been the rare case in which direct evidence 
of discrimination was available, Rutherford had the option of relying instead 
on such proof."); Gregory v. Chrysler Corp., No. 97-4442, 1999 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 8025, at *16 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 1999) ( Jones, J., dissenting) <"mt is the 
rare case that presents direct evidence of discrimination."); Douglas v. Dyn 
McDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 163 F.3d 223, 232 (5th Cir. 1998) (per 
curiam) (Dennis, J., dissenting) ("Because direct evidence of discrimination is 
rare, a plaintiff in a discrimination case must ordinarily use circumstantial 
evidence to satisfy her burden of persuasion." (citation omitted)); Washington 
v. Honeywell, Inc., No. 94-55590, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4604, at *7 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 28, 1996) ("Intent to discriminate in today's world is not openly 
expressed."); Olivera v. Nestle P.R., Inc., 922 F.2d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 1990) 
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with the smoking gun necessary to prove that discrimination 
motivated the employer's failure to hire or promote. Because of 
the difficulty of producing direct evidence of discrimination, the 
Supreme Court created the burden-shifting framework of 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 134 which allows a plaintiff 
to prove discrimination using circumstantial evidence.135 Yet, 
while the federal courts pay lip service to the difficulty of 
obtaining direct evidence of discrimination, they continue to 
erode the ability of plaintiffs to construct successful cases of 
discrimination on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. 
The research by social scientists, management specialists, 
academic institutions, and government agencies shows that 
discrimination in today's workplace operates in subtle ways 
that often are difficult to identify because they fail to fit 
traditional beliefs about how discrimination operates.I36 
Unfortunately, rather than adapting the flexible McDonnell 
Douglas paradigm to take account of the changing nature of 
("Although there was no smoking-gun evidence, it has been recognized that in 
discrimination cases direct evidence of bias is rare."); Rollins v. TechSouth, 
Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987) ("It is rare that direct evidence of 
discrimination exists."); see also Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the 
Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and 
ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 214 (1993). 
134. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
135. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring) ("As should be apparent, the entire purpose of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of 
intentional discrimination is hard to come by."); Rutherford, 197 F.3d at 180 
n.4 ("(A] plaintiff can rely on direct evidence, but it 'is rare in discrimination 
cases, [and] a plaintiff must ordinarily use circumstantial evidence to satisfy 
her burden of persuasion.'" (quoting Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 
989, 993 (5th Cir.1996) (en bane)); Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 
497, 507 (3d Cir. 1996) ("But our legal scheme against discrimination would be 
little more than a toothless tiger if the courts were to require such direct 
evidence of discrimination." (citations omitted)); Gries v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 90-
2430, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16729, at *9 (4th Cir. July 29, 1991) (stating that 
the McDonnell Douglas framework is available because of the difficulty of 
proving discriminatory intent); Forsberg v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 
1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that courts may infer discrimination from 
circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of discrimination is difficult to 
obtain); La Montagne v. Am. Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 
(7th Cir. 1984) (stating that even employers who knowingly discriminate may 
leave no records and so plaintiffs can prove discrimination indirectly by 
eliminating all lawful reasons for the challenged employment decision); 
Lockett v. Fort James Corp., No. 98-0612-CB-M 1999, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17017, 
at *13 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 4, 1999) (stating that the burden-shifting framework was 
created because of the difficulty of producing direct evidence of 
discrimination). 
136. See supra Part I. C. (citing such research). 
616 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:587 
discrimination, many federal courts are actually doing the 
opposite: narrowing the legal definition of actionable 
discrimination. 
This trend toward narrowing the legal definition of 
actionable discrimination is not occurring consistently across 
federal district courts or across circuits. On one end of the 
spectrum are those courts that ignore evidence of subtle 
discrimination. For example, some federal courts have 
narrowed the inquiry into the legitimacy of the employer's 
hiring, promotion, or termination decision, concluding that the 
logic or reasonableness of the reasons for the challenged 
employment action are not relevant to the legitimacy inquiry.l37 
Yet an illogical or irrational decision may suggest 
discrimination, especially in a culture that purports to reward 
on the basis of merit. By failing to examine the logic of the 
challenged employment decision, these courts fail to 
acknowledge the more subtle ways that discrimination operates 
in today's workplace. On the other end of the spectrum, 
however, are those circuits employing the ''honest belief' 
standard138 and, until recently, the "pretext-plus" requirement 
in circumstantial evidence cases.I39 These circuits raise the 
evidentiary bar so high for plaintiffs that they essentially 
remake the circumstantial evidence case into one requiring 
direct evidence of discrimination. 
The end result is that plaintiffs are finding it increasingly 
difficult to prevail in employment discrimination actions when 
they have only circumstantial evidence of discrimination. The 
alarming number of circumstantial evidence cases disposed of 
on summary judgment or on motions for judgment as a matter 
of law confirms this trend.140 As the courts restrict their 
137. See infra Part II.B. (discussing the erosion of the legitimacy 
requirement). 
138. See infra Part II.E. (discussing this standard). 
139. See infra Part II.F. (discussing this requirement). 
140. The following figures are based on 173 federal district court and 85 
court of appeals cases, or a total of 258 federal cases. For an explanation of 
how I arrived at this pool of cases, see supra note 12. 
In 137 of the 173 federal district court cases, the trial court granted 
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law on one or more of 
plaintiffs race, sex, or retaliation claims. In 60 of 85 court of appeals cases, 
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment or judgment as a matter oflaw on one or more of the plaintiffs race, 
sex, or retaliation claims, or reversed a trial court verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff. (These figures include cases in which the court granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of the employer, such as granting summary 
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oversight function, they legitimize current employment 
practices and limit the accountability of employers for more 
subtle forms of discrimination, even as the research indicates 
that greater, not less, government oversight ensures more fair 
outcomes in the workplace.14l Thus, by narrowing the 
definition of actionable discrimination, the federal courts 
reinforce the prevailing belief that merit, not subtle or systemic 
discrimination, accounts for the significant disparities in pay, 
position, and employment status between blacks and whites, 
and men and women, in today's workplace. 
B. THE EROSION OF THE LEGITIMACY REQUIREMENT 
Under the legal framework for proving intentional 
discrimination by circumstantial evidence, once the plaintiff 
makes out a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the 
employer must produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the challenged employment decision.142 If the employer 
meets this burden of production, 143 the plaintiff may still 
judgment on a claim of race discrimination but denying a motion for summary 
judgment on a corresponding claim of retaliation.) 
Thus, in 79% of the disparate treatment cases involving claims of race, 
sex, retaliation, or some combination of these three claims, the federal district 
court granted summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law to the 
employer. In 71% of the disparate treatment cases involving claims of race, 
sex, retaliation, or some combination of these three claims, the court of 
appeals either affirmed the trial court order granting summary judgment or 
judgment as a matter oflaw in favor of the employer, or reversed a trial court 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Counting both the federal district court and 
court of appeals cases, then, employers prevailed on summary judgment, 
judgment as a matter oflaw, or on appeal with a jury reversal in 197 (76%) of 
the 258 cases reported. 
141. See Perry et al., supra note 48, at 792 ("Organizations whose hiring 
and employment practices are exposed to scrutiny by powerful external 
constituents appear to have lower levels of gender segregation than 
organizations whose employment practices are not subject to external 
scrutiny."); see also id. at 802 ("Edelman (1992) has argued that one reason for 
the persistence of gender segregation is that, in many organizations, 
affirmative action offices are largely a symbolic response to legal pressures 
and lack the power to change decision makers' actions or cognitions." (citation 
omitted)); Reskin et al., supra note 65, at 342 (summarizing studies 
demonstrating that compliance with federal affirmative action guidelines and 
oversight by enforcement bodies increases the representation of women and 
racial minorities in the work force). 
142. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). 
143. Under the legal framework for circumstantial evidence cases, the 
employer need only produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, not 
persuade the court that the proffered reason actually motivated the challenged 
employment decision. Tex. Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
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prevail if she can demonstrate that the employer's articulated 
reason is a pretext for discrimination.I44 The plaintiff can 
demonstrate pretext in one of two ways. By "directly ... 
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer,"145 she can demonstrate that the 
employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was, in fact, 
discriminatory. Or, the plaintiff can discredit the legitimacy of 
the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason "indirectly 
by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence."l46 This latter method of proof involves 
creating an inference of discrimination by weaving together 
evidence that casts doubt on the legitimacy of the reasons 
offered by the employer for the challenged employment 
decision. 
The plaintiff can discredit the legitimacy of the employer's 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in two ways. She can 
offer evidence that the employer's reason is a lie or factually 
false, which suggests that the employer's reason is "unworthy 
of credence" because it is not authentic or genuine. But, if a 
plaintiff can show that the employer's reason makes no sense, 
this, too, suggests that the reason is "unworthy of credence," 
not because it is factually false, but because it is not reasonable 
or logicai.I47 Both methods of proof are consistent with the 
254-55 (1981). 
144. Until the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000), there was a split in the circuits 
about the pretext analysis. Some circuits required plaintiffs only to prove 
pretext, while others were pretext-plus circuits. See id. at 2104-05; see also 
infra note 307 and accompanying text. In Reeves, a unanimous decision, the 
Supreme Court held that a factfinder may-but is not required to-find 
employment discrimination on the basis of the plaintiffs prima facie case 
coupled with evidence of pretext. See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2109. Thus, the 
Court rejected the analysis followed by the pretext-plus circuits, which 
required plaintiffs not only to prove that the employer's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual but also to prove that the real reason 
for the challenged employment decision was discrimination. See infra Part 
II.F. 
145. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. 
146. Id. 
147. I use the term logical or valid in two ways. The first is a more narrow 
reading, in which the reason proffered by the employer is one that a rational 
employer might consider in an employment decision. See MACK A. PLAYER, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.40c(3)(a), at 334 (1988) ("'Legitimate' 
therefore presupposes that the reason be one which rational employers would 
utilize in taking personnel actions. Stated conversely, arbitrary, idiosyncratic 
reasons are not 'legitimate' because they would not support an inference that 
such a 'reason,' rather than illegal considerations, motivated the employer." 
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definition of ''legitimate" as "authentic," "genuine," 
"reasonable," or ''based on logical reasoning,"148 and with the 
Supreme Court's "unworthy of credence" standard from Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.I49 
Increasingly, however, the federal courts have narrowed 
the definition of ''legitimate" to mean "authentic" or "genuine," 
disregarding as legally irrelevant evidence showing that the 
employer's articulated reason is invalid or illogical.I50 As a 
(footnote omitted)). The second reading is broader and applies to cases in 
which the individual hiring or promotion criteria are valid. Yet, in the 
aggregate, the employer's decision appears illogical, such as a preference for a 
candidate who excels on only one out of four relevant hiring criteria. See 
Simms v. Oklahoma, 165 F.3d 1321, 1328-30 (lOth Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 
S. Ct. 53 (1999). 
148. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 723 (2d ed. 1985); see also 
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S 775 (1991). 
149. 450 u.s. 248 (1981). 
150. See, e.g., Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 
n.14 (lOth Cir. 1999) ("Thus, the court's role in this case was not to determine 
if United's hiring decisions were wise or fair, but rather, in the context of Ms. 
Bullington's disparate treatment claim, if those decisions were motivated by 
discriminatory animus."); Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 
F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1999) ("As this court has previously explained, '[c]ourts 
may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits-or even the 
rationality of employers' nondiscriminatory business decisions.'" (citation 
omitted)); Rose-Maston v. NME Hosps., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 
1998) ('"[T]he employment discrimination laws have not vested in the federal 
courts the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the 
wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to 
the extent that those judgments involve intentional discrimination.'" (citations 
omitted)); Antle v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1259 
(D. Kan. 1999) ("When an employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason 
for an employment decision, 'it is not our province to decide whether that 
reason was wise, fair, or even correct' . . . . [T]he pertinent question is not 
whether the employer was correct in its assessment, but whether the 
employer's stated belief was genuine." (citations omitted)); Byrnie v. Town of 
Cromwell Pub. Schs., 73 F. Supp. 2d 204, 214 (D. Conn. 1999) ("Title VII and 
the ADEA are not violated just because an employer made an erroneous, poor, 
or illogical business decision." (citation omitted)); Bickerstaff v. Nordstrom, 
Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 790, 800 (N.D. ill. 1999) (stating that an employer's 
reasons for the challenged employment decision "need not be compelling; they 
can be 'foolish or trivial or even baseless'" (citation omitted)); Meng v. Ipanema 
Shoe Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 392, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Accordingly, to 'defeat a 
properly supported motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must produce 
sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the employer were false, and that 
more than likely the employee's [race] was the real reason for discharge.'" 
(citation omitted)); Ichile v. City of Chicago, No. 95-C-3507, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13764, at *27 (N.D. ill. Aug. 31, 1998) <"mt is not enough for the 
plaintiff to show that a reason given for a job action is not just, or fair, or 
sensible . . . he must show that the explanation given is 'a phony reason.'" 
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result, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's 
proffered reasons are factually false, which often is more 
difficult, especially when subjective criteria are involved, than 
demonstrating that the employer's reasons are illogical or that 
the challenged employment decision, based on relative 
qualifications, makes no sense. Nothing in the word 
"legitimate" or the phrase "unworthy of credence" necessitates 
this restrictive definition. 
Simms v. Oklahoma151 illustrates how this narrow reading 
of the legitimacy requirement significantly disadvantages 
plaintiffs whose pretext argument relies, at least in part, on the 
logic of the challenged employment decision. Simms involved a 
race discrimination claim brought by Cedric Simms, a black 
man, against his employer, the Oklahoma Department of 
Mental Health and Substance Abuse (Department) for failing 
to promote him to the position of Fire and Safety Officer 
Supervisor.I52 The Department promoted Bruce Valley, a white 
employee, citing Valley's "substantially greater supervisory 
experience."l53 The employer considered at least four criteria in 
its job selection process: (1) education as a firefighter, (2) 
training as a firefighter, (3) interview scores, and (4) 
supervisory experience.I54 Simms had more education and 
greater training as a firefighter than did Valley.155 On the first 
round of interviews, Simms scored slightly higher than did 
Valley.156 The employer conducted a second round of 
interviews, after which Valley was selected for the job.157 
On two of the four criteria, Simms had better qualifications 
than Valley. On the third criterion-the interview-the 
candidates were comparable.I58 Valley, however, had 
substantially more supervisory experience than did Simms.I59 
Valley's experience, however, was in the construction industry, 
(citation omitted)). 
151. 165 F.3d 1321 (lOth Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 53 (1999). 
152. Simms had filed a prior lawsuit against his employer for failure to 
promote him to the position of Fire and Safety Officer II. The suit was settled, 
and Simms was promoted. Id. at 1324. 
153. Id. at 1330. 
154. Id. at 1324-25, 1329-30. 
155. Id. at 1330. 
156. Id. at 1329 n.4. 
157. Id. at 1324-25. 
158. Simms scored higher on the first round of interviews, while Valley 
scored higher on the second round. See id. 
159. Id. at 1330. 
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and Simms had been Valley's supervisor when the Department 
posted the position for Fire and Safety Officer Supervisor.160 
Because the Department relied on Valley's supervisory 
experience in its promotion decision, Simms had to 
demonstrate that that reason was "unworthy of belief."16I 
Simms could not survive summary judgment simply by 
questioning, without more, the Department's reliance on the 
one qualification on which Valley excelled.162 Simms offered 
other evidence, including his prior successful claim of race 
discrimination against the Department, to show that the 
Department's real reason for failing to promote him was his 
race.163 The trial court, however, granted summary judgment 
in favor of the employer, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.I64 
The Simms decision illustrates the weakness of the federal 
courts' narrow reading of. the term "legitimate." Simms 
demonstrated that on two out of four job-related criteria he 
possessed qualifications superior to those held by the candidate 
selected.I6S He and the other candidate were comparable on the 
interview, with Simms receiving a better score in the first 
round and the other candidate scoring higher on the second 
round of interviews.I66 The only criterion on which the chosen 
candidate excelled was supervisory experience. But Simms had 
supervisory experience; in fact, he was the chosen candidate's 
supervisor at the time of the promotion decision.I67 
Simms also presented evidence of possible retaliation by 
his employer. Simms had successfully settled a prior race 
discrimination claim against the employer.168 Thus, the 
employer had reason to retaliate. When coupled with the 
160. ld. at 1324. 
161. ld. at 1329. 
162. See infra text accompanying notes 170-76. (discussing how bias can be 
buried in an employer's preference for a particular qualification). 
163. See Simms, 165 F.3d at 1329-31. 
164. ld. at 1331. Like many of the opinions discussed in this Article, the 
Tenth Circuit's decision is the result of a variety of factors. To begin with, the 
Tenth Circuit failed to appreciate the subtle ways in which retaliation 
operates and, thus, failed to examine the logic or validity of the employer's 
promotion decision. In addition, the court required Simms to prove that he 
was clearly better qualified than Valley, the candidate promoted. See id. at 
1330. This raised the evidentiary bar for Simms, making it much more 
difficult to survive summary judgment. 
165. ld. at 1329-30. 
166. ld. at 1329. 
167. Id. at 1324. 
168. ld. 
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employer's decision to favor a white candidate whose job-
related qualifications exceeded Simms on only one out of four 
relevant job criteria, the court should have denied the 
employer's motion for summary judgment based on the 
legitimacy of the challenged employment decision. 
Narrowing the legitimacy requirement to proof that the 
employer's reason is false or phony means that the courts will 
miss the more prevalent, subtle forms of discrimination that 
predominate in today's market.169 Simms illustrates the 
problem. 
First, suppose that the employer in Simms was not lying 
about the need for supervisory experience. Does that make the 
employer's decision legitimate? The real issue raised by the 
Simms case is whether subtle and unspoken bias affected the 
employer's decision to emphasize supervisory experience, the 
one qualification on which the white candidate excelled, as 
opposed to other job criteria-education and training-on 
which Simms excelled. This is an important distinction 
because employers often make hiring and promotion decisions 
on the basis of multiple criteria, some objective and others 
subjective. When an employer has multiple criteria for hiring, 
one candidate rarely emerges as superior on all dimensions.I70 
Instead, effective employment procedures produce several fully 
qualified candidates, each of whom possesses different 
strengths. The Society for Human Resource Management171 
acknowledged this fact in its amicus brief before the Supreme 
Court in Johnson v. Transportation Agency.m "[A] standard 
tenet of personnel administration [is] that there is rarely a 
single, 'best qualified' person for a job. An effective personnel 
system will bring before the selecting official several fully-
qualified candidates who each may possess different attributes 
which recommend them for selection."173 Therefore, if an 
employer uses multiple criteria for hiring and promotion 
decisions, the employer generally can point to at least one job 
criterion on which the non-selected candidate was weaker, 
169. For a discussion of subtle bias, see supra Part I.C. 
170. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 151-64. 
171. The organization formerly was known as the American Society for 
Personnel Administration. My thanks to Dr. Rebecca Luzaclis for making me 
aware of this change in nomenclature. 
172. 480 u.s. 616 (1987). 
173. Brief for the American Society for Personnel Administration as 
Amicus Curiae 9, quoted in Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641 n.17. 
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thereby asserting the superior qualifications of the candidate 
they select as the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
justifying their employment decision.174 
For instance, an employer . . . might subtly re-evaluate the most 
important qualifications for a job, depending on the race of different 
applicants. If, say, a white applicant had broader experience and a 
black applicant had more up-to-date training, the employer would 
decide that experience was more important; if the white applicant had 
more-recent training and the black more experience, the employer 
would decide that experience was less important. Thus, the 
[employer] would find a way to hire the white applicant without 
admitting to himself or herself that racial bias played a role in the 
choice.175 
174. For cases in which the employer justified the challenged employment 
decision on the grounds of the superior qualifications of the candidate selected, 
see Islar v. Ourisman Chevrolet Co., No. 97-2641, No. 98-1185, 1999 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 538, at *6 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1999); Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 
865, 869-70 (11th Cir. 1998); Ballor v. Alcona County Rd. Comm'n, No. 97-
1413, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10519, at *5 (6th Cir. May 20, 1998); Nichols v. 
Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 565 (5th Cir. 1998); Florence v. United States Vanadium 
Corp., No. 97-7443, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22579, at *7 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1998); 
Paulsboe v. Farnam Cos., No. 97-7003, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19990, at* 5 
(lOth Cir. Aug. 1, 1997); Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 990 (3d Cir. 
1997); Johnson v. Rubin, No. 95-55456, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 764, at *8 (9th 
Cir. Jan. 13, 1997); Grimes v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental 
Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996); Ellis v. Blood Sys., Inc., No. 95-
2114, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 15643, at *4-5 (7th Cir. June 25, 1996). 
175. Dovidio, supra note 77; see Nichols, 138 F.3d at 568. In reversing the 
jury verdict for the plaintiff on her sex discrimination claim for failure to 
promote, the Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs argument that her employer 
had changed the ranking of criteria it used to fill the challenged position, 
noting that "[t]he promotion decision is a dynamic one, and the relative 
importance placed on various selection criteria cannot be expected to remain 
fixed and unyielding." Id.; see also Moon v. Tennessee, No. 96-5513, 1997 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 17479, at *4 (6th Cir. July 9, 1997) (affirming the trial court 
verdict in favor of the employer on the plaintiffs race discrimination claim for 
failure to promote, even though the employer admitted that its "selection 
process was unusual," and "a strict reading of the qualifications suggest[ed] 
that [the] degree and biology credits [of the candidate selected] [did] not 
satisfy the minimum standards set by Tennessee for a Microbiologist III"); 
Wright v. Tultex Corp., No. 97-0060-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20383, at *14 
(W.D. Va. Dec. 14, 1998) (granting summary judgment for the employer even 
though its job notice stated "college degree preferred," which the employer 
subsequently explained meant a four-year degree, not the associate's degree 
held by the white female plaintifi); Jennings v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 
97 C 6385, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12004, at *33 n.6 (N.D. ill. July 30, 1998) 
("Jennings' basic argument that an employer is bound by the generalized 
description of minimal qualifications contained in the job posting is baseless."). 
But see Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 643 
(11th Cir. 1998) ("[S]hoddy drafting does not give an employer license to 
redefine job requirements on the fly in an attempt to win summary 
judgment."). 
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Therefore, unless a federal court examines the logic of a 
challenged employment decision, subtle bias can almost always 
be buried in at least one objective, or even subjective, job 
criterion on which the selected candidate excelled.I76 
Second, focusing on the employer's intent, that is, whether 
the employer lied, does not address the fact that prejudice and 
bias often affect perception, and perception shapes employment 
outcomes. The research indicates that white candidates, and 
white male candidates in particular, are perceived as more 
qualified than black and female candidates, even when 
objective qualifications are held constant.177 For example, 
when faced with an equally qualified white and black 
candidate, white evaluators score the white candidate more 
favorably than the black candidate.178 Goldin and Rouse's 
study indicates that blind auditions benefit female musicians 
because it removes consideration of their sex from evaluation of 
176. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 279-88. The problem is 
exacerbated by the trend in some federal courts toward granting summary 
judgment or even reversing a trial court verdict in favor of the plaintiff when 
the plaintiff fails to discount each of the employer's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons. This provides an employer with an incentive to 
provide multiple reasons for its decision. Thus, even when a plaintiff can 
demonstrate that an employer lied about two out of three reasons offered for 
its promotion decision, the jury is not allowed to draw an inference that the 
employer also may have lied about the third reason provided for the 
challenged employment decision. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 
1519, 1539-43 (11th Cir. 1997) (reversing a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
on his race discrimination claim because he failed to refute one of the three 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons offered by his employer for its 
promotion decision), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045 (1998); see also Scott v. Univ. 
of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating, in an age discrimination 
suit, that "to give rise to ... an inference of discrimination, the [plaintiff] must 
provide some evidence, direct or circumstantial, to rebut each of the 
employer's proffered reasons"); Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 45 F. 
Supp. 2d 888, 893 (D. Kan. 1999) (citing with approval a Seventh Circuit case 
that stated that the plaintiff must provide evidence challenging each of the 
employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons); Blevins v. Heilig-Meyers 
Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1348 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("However, in order to 
survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must show that 'there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth 
of each of the employer's proffered reasons for its challenged actions.'" 
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted)), affd, 184 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 1999); 
Eaton v. Hill, No. 3:97-CV-124RP, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17909, at *19 (N.D. 
Ind. Sept. 28, 1998) ("Based upon the evidence presented, the court must 
conclude that even if [the plaintiff] had shown pretext on the issue of 
attendance, the [employer] would still be entitled to summary judgment based 
on the additional reasons it asserted for not promoting [the plaintiff]."). 
177. See supra Part I. C. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 88-95. 
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their merit as musicians.179 A recent study by Patricia Devine 
and Andrew Elliot reveals that a high percentage of whites 
identify laziness, low intelligence, and lack of education as 
qualities associated with the stereotype of the black 
American.ISO Devine and Elliot's research shows that 
"stereotypes can be automatically activated by the perception of 
social stimuli (e.g., exemplars of the group, group labels), 
resulting in prejudice-like feelings, thoughts, and behaviors for 
high- and low-prejudiced individuals alike."18l These 
stereotypes and cultural beliefs may shape the way in which 
qualified black and female candidates are evaluated.1s2 While 
qualified for the position, they rarely are ''better qualified" than 
the white or white male candidate for the job. 
As a result, invoking the language of ''best qualified" 
should not insulate employment decisions from scrutiny by the 
federal courts. As the Third Circuit noted in Bray v. Marriott 
Hotels, 183 Title VII also should address the fact that bias can 
actually shape employer perceptions such that the ''best 
qualified" candidate is never black. 
[Title VII] must not be applied in a manner that ignores the sad 
reality that racial animus can all too easily warp an individual's 
perspective to the point that he or she never considers the member of 
a protected class the "best" candidate regardless of that person's 
credentials. The dissent's position would immunize an employer from 
the reach of Title VII if the employer's belief that it had selected the 
"best" candidate, was [not] the result of conscious racial bias. Thus, 
the issue here, is not merely whether [the employer] was seeking the 
"best" candidate but whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude 
that [the plaintifl] was not deemed the best because she is Black. 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20. 
180. See Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes 
Really Fading? The Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1146 tbl.3 (1995). Little discrepancy existed in the 
ability of low-prejudice versus high-prejudice whites to identify the elements 
of the stereotype. See id. at 1147. For example, 78% oflow-prejudice whites 
and 82% of high-prejudice whites identified 1aziness as a stereotypical black 
trait. See id. at 1146 tbl.3. 
181. ld. at 1147. 
182. See, e.g., Ferron v. West, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1367, 1371 (S.D. Ga. 
1998) (granting summary judgment for the employer on a failure-to-promote 
claim based on race, despite the plaintiffs greater expertise in job-related 
skill-firefighting-and more federal work experience than other candidates, 
based on white supervisors' evaluations of plaintiff as lazy and lacking the 
initiative and motivation of white candidates); cf. Devine & Elliot, supra note 
180, at 1148-49 (stating that racial stereotypes are "deeply embedded in the 
cultural fabric of our nation"). ~ 
183. 110 F.3d 986 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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Indeed, Title VII would be eviscerated if our analysis were to halt 
where the dissent suggests. 184 
Finally, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is phony, false, 
or a lie is especially problematic in cases involving subjective 
employment criteria_l85 Subjective evaluation criteria provide 
employers with "deplorably fertile grounds" for "disguis[ing] 
their personal biases."186 Absent an admission by the 
employer, how does a plaintiff effectively dispute the 
employer's contention that the selected candidate performed 
better in the interview than did the plaintiff? 
The reluctance on the part of many federal courts to 
examine the logic of employers' hiring, firing, and promotion 
decisions virtually ensures that subtle discrimination will 
continue to influence employment decisions. Limiting the 
ability of a plaintiff to challenge the reasonableness or logic of 
an employer's decision means that the plaintiff needs either 
direct evidence of discriminatory intent or proof that the 
employer lied about the reasons it offered for the challenged 
employment decision. Both forms of proof are difficult to come 
by in today's market. Moreover, requiring such evidence at the 
summary judgment stage187 means that fewer plaintiffs will be 
184. Id. at 993. 
185. See, e.g., Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 
635, 644 (11th Cir. 1998) ("While there is nothing inherently wrong with 
allowing decision makers to base decisions on subjective criteria, we have 
found that 'subjective evaluations involving white supervisors provide a ready 
mechanism for racial discrimination.'" (citation omitted)); Hartley v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., No. 94-4257, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25299, at *11-12 (6th Cir. 
Aug. 28, 1996) (Jones, J., concurring) ("While subjective selection procedures 
are not illegal per se, ... they have been found to 'provide a ready mechanism 
for discrimination, permitting . . . prejudice to affect and often control 
promotion and hiring decisions.'" (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); 
Lane v. Ogden Entm't, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 1998) 
("Where subjectivity on the part of differently-raced supervisors is the basis of 
job requirements, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that there is a 'ready 
mechanism for racial discrimination.'" (citation omitted)). 
186. Hartley, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25299, at *13 (Jones, J., concurring); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 88-128 (discussing the subtle influence 
of race and sex on the evaluation of performance). 
187. See, e.g., Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1319 
(lOth Cir. 1999) (affirming an order granting summary judgment on the white 
female plaintiffs disparate treatment claims of sex and age discrimination and 
deferring to the employer's explanation that the plaintiff had performed poorly 
in the interview, even though the plaintiff offered statistical evidence that 
women fared significantly less well in·the interview process than did men, and 
rejecting the plaintiffs claim that she had better objective qualifications than 
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able to obtain a trial on the merits. This, in turn, limits the 
definition of actionable discrimination to more overt forms of 
other candidates selected, because "[a]t most, the seven other candidates were 
similarly qualified"); Bell v. EPA, No. 97 C 6349, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16445 
(N.D. ill. Oct. 15, 1999) (granting summary judgment to the employer on four 
plaintiffs' race, national origin, and age discrimination claims, even though 
the plaintiffs had objectively better qualifications than the four white 
candidates selected for promotion to GS-13 positions, the plaintiffs offered a 
memorandum drafted by one of the four selecting officials in which he said 
that two of the four plaintiffs were superior to some of the selected white 
candidates, and the plaintiffs offered evidence of inconsistent statements 
made by one of the selecting officials and inconsistent statements about the 
existence of a consensus among the selecting officials as to which candidates 
were best qualified for promotion); Booker v. Dayton Hudson Corp., No. 98 C 
0737, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16241 (N.D. ill. Oct. 5, 1999) (granting summary 
judgment to the employer on a white female plaintiffs claim that pregnancy 
and sex discrimination motivated the employer's decision to terminate her and 
deferring to the employer's explanation that it had done so because the 
plaintiff had violated company policy and was held to a higher standard as a 
supervisor, even though a male employee who also had violated company 
policy and was caught on videotape doing so was never disciplined and was 
subsequently promoted by employer); Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
45 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892-93 (D. Kan. 1999) (granting summary judgment to the 
employer on a black male plaintiff's race discrimination claim and deferring to 
the employer's explanation that it had not hired plaintiff because he had not 
performed well during the interview and had not completed the employment 
application, even though the plaintiff offered evidence that the employer's 
interviewer may have fabricated the interview notes after the plaintiff filed 
his race discrimination claim, employer did not raise the "incomplete 
application" defense before the state civil rights commission, and the employer 
accepted incomplete applications from the other white and black applicants), 
affd, 220 F.3d 1174 (lOth Cir. 2000); Romero v. Banco Popular de P.R., 35 F. 
Supp. 2d 195 (D.P.R. 1999) (granting summary judgment to the employer on a 
black male plaintiffs race and national origin claims and deferring to the 
employer's contention that the white candidate selected was the superior 
candidate, even though some selection criteria were subjective, the white 
candidate selected did not have the minimum educational requirements for 
the job, the position that the plaintiff sought was being vacated by plaintiffs 
immediate supervisor, who was never asked about plaintiffs qualifications for 
the job, and the plaintiffs immediate supervisor and another retired bank 
official presented sworn affidavits stating that the employer had unwritten 
rules about not promoting black employees), affd in part, vacated in part, 212 
F.3d 607 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming the decision as to failure to promote and 
constructive termination claims, but remanding on a race-based harassment 
charge); see also infra Part II.D. (discussing the need for employees to prove 
superior qualifications in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits); cf. Kennedy v. Quaker 
Oats Co., No. 97-CV-72094-DT, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15340, at *6-7, 27 (E.D. 
Mich. Aug. 17, 1998) (granting summary judgment for the employer on a white 
male plaintiffs age discrimination claim even though the criteria the employer 
used to evaluate employees as part of the downsizing plan were subjective, the 
employer did not validate the criteria used, and the plaintiff offered statistical 
evidence showing the significant impact of the downsizing plan on older 
workers). 
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bias and reinforces the belief that discrimination in today's 
market is an anomaly. 
C. REDEFINING ISSUES OF FACT AS ISSUES OF LAW 
1. Introduction 
In circumstantial evidence cases, summary judgment 
should be used sparingly because a determination of 
discriminatory intent is essentially a question of fact. 188 "The 
role of determining whether the inference of discrimination is 
warranted must remain within the province of the jury, 
because a finding of discrimination is at bottom a 
determination of intent."189 Increasingly, however, the federal 
courts are usurping the role of the jury by making fact 
determinations on summary judgment under the guise of 
determining whether the plaintiff has made out a legally 
188. See Nesbitt v. Am. Drug Stores, 82 F. Supp. 2d 832, 833 (N.D. Ill. 
1999) ("Moreover, 'intent and credibility are crucial issues in employment 
discrimination cases, and therefore, the summary judgment standard is 
applied with added rigor in such cases.'" (citation omitted)); Meng v. Ipanema 
Shoe Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 392, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Summary judgment 
should be used cautiously in employment discrimination cases 'where, as here, 
the employer's intent is at issue.'" (citations omitted)); Salmon v. West Clark 
Community Schs., 64 F. Supp. 2d 850, 859 (S.D. Ind. 1999) ("When summary 
judgment is sought in an employment discrimination case, as here, the criteria 
associated with summary judgment must be applied with 'added scrutiny 
because matters of intent and credibility are crucial issues.'" (citations 
omitted)); Zephyr v. Ortho M$:Neil Pharm., 62 F. Supp. 2d 599, 601 (D. Conn. 
1999) ("A district court must be especially cautious about granting summary 
judgment in an employment discrimination case when the employer's intent is 
at issue." (citation omitted)); Taylor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc., 
55 F. Supp. 2d 604, 608 (N.D. Tex. 1999) ("Because employment 
discrimination claims involve nebulous questions of motivation and intent, 
summary judgment is usually considered an inappropriate tool for resolving 
these cases." (citation omitted)); Johnson v. Runyon, 928 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D. 
Md. 1996) ("In Title VII cases, courts should be wary of summary judgment 
motions because a party's intent is often the crucial element in such cases." 
(citation omitted)), affd per curiam, 151 F.3d 1029 (4th Cir. 1998); see also 
McGinley, supra note 133, at 208 (noting that civil rights cases "most often 
turn on subtle questions of credibility and intent that only a factfinder faced 
with a live witness should decide" (footnote omitted)); see generally Theresa M. 
Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 95-96 (1999) (agreeing with those federal courts 
that hold that hostile environment cases "do not lend themselves to decision 
on summary judgment" because of the "highly fact-specific inquiry" involved 
(footnote omitted)). 
189. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1071 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
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sufficient claim of employment discrimination.19° By defining 
certain kinds of evidence as legally irrelevant to the 
determination of discriminatory animus, the federal courts 
have significantly narrowed the legal definition of actionable 
discrimination. This, in turn, makes it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to construct cases of discrimination based on 
circumstantial evidence alone. 
2. Retaliation 
The research on organizational justice demonstrates that 
employees who file discrimination complaints or other types of 
grievances fare worse in the organization than employees who 
do not pursue such claims.I9I Moreover, employees who win 
190. See, e.g., EEOC v. MCI Telecomms., Inc., No. 98-1195, 1999 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 17847, at *9-10 (4th Cir. July 28, 1999) (affirming an order granting 
summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiffs claim of race and 
national origin discrimination, noting that while the selecting official 
"emphasized differing criteria" in explaining his rationale for not hiring the 
plaintiff, "this inconsistency [did not] riseO to the level of mendacity"); Bell v. 
EPA, No. 97 C 6349, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16445, at *17-20 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 
1999) (granting summary judgment to the employer on the plaintiffs' race, 
national origin, and age discrimination claims and concluding that a written 
memorandum drafted by one of the selecting officials which stated that two of 
four plaintiffs were better qualified than the candidates selected was 
inadmissible hearsay and, thus, could not establish evidence of pretext); 
Bickerstaff v. Nordstrom, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 790, 800 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 
(granting summary judgment to the employer on the plaintiffs race 
discrimination claim, concluding that the employer may have lied to the 
plaintiff about the reasons the plaintiff was not selected for position because a 
lie "might have been more palatable" and that "[n]ot every lie" constitutes 
evidence of bad intent, "even if the lie is related to the employment decision" 
(citation omitted)); Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d 888, 
892 (D. Kan. 1999) (granting summary judgment to the employer on the 
plaintiffs race discrimination and retaliation claims, in part, because the 
plaintiff supposedly performed poorly in the interview, by crediting the 
employer's explanation that even though the interviewer had signed and dated 
the plaintiffs employment application several months after the plaintiff had 
filed his discrimination claim, the "confusion" about the interview date did not 
"raise an issue as to whether the notes [the interviewer] made during the 
interview were fabricated for the purposes of this litigation"); see also cases 
cited infra at Parts ll.C.2. & 3.; McGinley, supra note 133, at 237-41 
(explaining that federal courts in employment discrimination cases are 
making credibility determinations in favor of employers at the summary 
judgment stage). 
191. See Anne Lawton, The Emperor's New Clothes: How the Academy 
Deals with Sexual Harassment, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 126-28 (1999) 
(citing studies showing that employees who file grievances or discrimination 
claims are significantly more likely to experience negative employment-related 
treatment). 
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grievances against their employers have "significantly lower 
rates of promotion and significantly higher rates of termination 
and lay-offs than similarly situated employees who ha[ve] lost 
their appeals."192 The research suggests that employers punish 
employees who file grievances, especially when the employee 
prevails on her grievance.I93 
Most employers, however, are unlikely to admit to 
retaliation. A plaintiff then must prove her case through 
circumstantial evidence. Yet, a number of federal courts have 
made it easier for employers to prevail on motions for summary 
judgment in retaliation cases by restricting the kinds of 
evidence that the court considers legally relevant to a finding of 
retaliation.I94 For example, some courts have granted 
192. I d. at 127. 
193. Id. 
194. See, e.g., Simms v. Oklahoma, 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (lOth Cir. 1999) 
(affirming an order granting summary judgment for the employer on a race 
discrimination claim, notwithstanding the plaintiffs strong objective 
qualifications and the prior settlement of a race discrimination suit against 
the employer, because the plaintiff could not connect the individuals involved 
in his current claim of discrimination to those involved in the successful race 
discrimination suit), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 53 (1999); Johnson v. Runyon, 928 
F. Supp. 575, 585, 589 (D. Md. 1996) (granting summary judgment for the 
employer on two separate claims of retaliatory discrimination, discounting the 
plaintiffs claims by noting that knowledge of prior discrimination complaints 
does not suffice to show retaliation), affd per curiam, 151 F.3d 1029 (4th Cir. 
1998); Roberts v. Oklahoma, No. 95-6235, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6679, at *22-
25 (lOth Cir. Apr. 8, 1997) (affirming an order granting summary judgment for 
the employer on a sex discrimination claim, finding that the plaintiffs 
complaints about procedural irregularities in the screening process did not 
demonstrate pretext because the employer corrected these irregularities by 
convening a second screening committee after the plaintiff registered her 
complaint). 
The Fifth Circuit has narrowly circumscribed the legal definition of 
retaliation, under § 704 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to include only 
ultimate employment decisions, such as termination. See Mattern v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997). Negative performance reviews, 
reprimands by supervisors, and disciplinary action taken against employees 
who have complained of employment discrimination do not constitute evidence 
of retaliation in the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 708; see also Wakefield v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 545, 549 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (granting summary 
judgment to the employer on the black male plaintiffs retaliation claims 
because negative performance evaluations and failure of the employer to 
consider the plaintiff for promotion, based on those performance evaluations, 
do not give rise to an actionable claim for retaliation as neither involves an 
ultimate employment decision), affd, 200 U.S. App. LEXIS 22589 (5th Cir. 
2000); see also Valentine v. Bowsher, No. 3:96-CV-0982-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8992, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 1998) (granting summary judgment on 
the black female plaintiffs retaliation claim "[a]ssuming arguendo that the 
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summary judgment in favor of the employer even though the 
plaintiff has presented evidence of a negative employment 
action taken anywhere from two weeks to ten months after the 
employee complained of employment discrimination.195 Other 
courts have concluded, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff 
cannot prevail on a retaliation claim even if she provides 
evidence that a supervisor against whom the plaintiff has filed 
a discrimination claim participated in the challenged 
employment decision and that the challenged employment 
decision involved subjective criteria.196 
[challenged employment actions were] ultimate employment decisions"), affd, 
172 F.3d 869 (5th Cir. 1999); Walker v. Uncle Bens, Inc., No. 4:97-CV-65-D-B, 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4648, at *26-28 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 1998) (granting 
the employer's motion for summary judgment on the black female plaintiffs 
retaliation claim based on failure to obtain a "right-to-sue" letter, and citing 
with approval the "ultimate employment decision" rationale of Mattern). By 
narrowly defining what constitutes actionable retaliation, the Fifth Circuit 
has rendered a jury trial unnecessary except in those circumstances where the 
employer, for example, has fired the employee in retaliation for protected Title 
VII activity. But see Marshall v. Shalala, 16 F. Supp. 2d 16, 21 n.7 (D.D.C. 
1998) (declining to adopt the Fifth Circuit's "narrower view of the type of 
retaliatory conduct that is actionable under Title VII"), affd, 1999 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 7352 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 2, 1999). 
195. See, e.g., Simmons v. Oce-USA, Inc., 174 F.3d 913,914 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(affirming summarily the district court's order granting summary judgment on 
the plaintiffs claim of retaliatory discharge, even though the employer 
terminated the plaintiff only four months after the plaintiff filed suit for race 
discrimination); Carpenter v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 174 F.3d 231, 234 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (affirming an order granting summary judgment on the 
plaintiffs retaliation claim even though she received a less-favorable 
performance evaluation than those she had received in the past only two 
weeks after filing an appeal in her discrimination claim against the employer), 
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 184 (1999); Malone v. K-Mart Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 
1287, 1307 n.13 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (granting summary judgment on a 
retaliation claim, in part, because the plaintiffs poor performance evaluations, 
which she alleged were in retaliation for her race and sex discrimination 
complaints, occurred ten months after the plaintiffs EEOC charge and, hence, 
"were 'not temporally close enough to support an inference of causal 
connection'" (citation omitted)). But see Stewart v. Rutgers, 120 F.3d 426, 433-
34 (3d Cir. 1997) (reversing the trial court's order granting summary judgment 
for the employer and concluding that a grievance committee's finding that 
denial of tenure to the plaintiff in 1992-93 was "arbitrary and capricious" was 
relevant to the plaintiffs race discrimination claim for denial of tenure in 
1994-1995). 
196. See, e.g., Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 
1998) (affirming an order granting summary judgment for the employer on the 
plaintiffs race discrimination claim because "there was no causal connection" 
between a supervisor's racist comment and the employer's failure to promote 
the plaintiff, even though the supervisor was disciplined for the comment and 
the employer based its promotion decision on the supervisor's annual 
evaluation of the plaintiffs performance), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1051 (1999); 
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The D.C. Circuit's decision in Carpenter v. Federal 
National Mortgage Ass'n197 (Carpenter II) illustrates how the 
federal courts are making factual determinations on summary 
judgment, resulting in a narrower definition of what 
constitutes actionable retaliation under Title VII. Carpenter II 
involved a claim by Joann Carpenter, a white woman, against 
her employer, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae), alleging that Fannie Mae had denied her a promotion 
and downgraded her performance rating in retaliation for filing 
a prior complaint of sex discrimination (Carpenter I) against 
Fannie Mae. 198 While Carpenter had received performance 
ratings of "5" and "5-" for the seven years prior to filing 
Carpenter I, she received a rating of "4+" only two weeks after 
lodging an appeal in that case.I99 In addition, shortly after 
filing the Carpenter I appeal, Carpenter learned that her 
supervisor, Anastasia Kelly, had selected another candidate for 
a senior vice president position in Fannie Mae's General 
Counsel office.2oo Fannie Mae justified rejecting Carpenter for 
the senior vice president position because she lacked litigation 
experience, which Fannie Mae allegedly desired.201 The district 
court granted summary judgment for Fannie Mae on both of 
Grimes v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 
138-39 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming an order granting summary judgment for the 
employer on a race discrimination claim, even though the plaintiff had won a 
prior case of race discrimination against the employer and the white man who 
had obtained that discriminatory promotion was responsible for the promotion 
decision giving rise to the instant race discrimination case); Valentine v. 
Bowsher, No. 3:96-CV-0982-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8992 (N.D. Tex. June 
15, 1998) (granting summary judgment to the employer on retaliation claim 
based on the employer's failure to place the plaintiff on its Best Qualified list 
for promotion on two separate occasions after the plaintiff had filed a race 
discrimination complaint even though the employer offered no evidence that 
its rankings for the Best Qualified list were based on objective, 
nondiscriminatory criteria, and the plaintiff offered evidence that one of the 
members of the Best Qualified ranking panel had been on the panel about 
which the plaintiff had filed her priqr discrimination complaint and that same 
panel member had made negative comments about plaintiff), affd, 172 F.3d 
869 (5th Cir. 1999). 
197. 174 F.3d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 184 (1999). 
198. Id. at 234. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the trial court's order granting 
summary judgment to Fannie Mae on Carpenter's prior claim of employment 
discrimination. Id. In her first lawsuit, Carpenter claimed that Fannie Mae 
had discriminated against her by failing to promote her. Id. 
199. ld. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 235. 
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Carpenter's claims.2o2 In a surprising decision, the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed the trial court's decision,203 giving short shrift to the 
possibility that Carpenter's two supervisors, who had been 
involved in prior "contentious" litigation204 with her, had 
influenced either her evaluation downgrade or her chances for 
promotion to senior vice president. 
First, even though Carpenter offered evidence that both 
Kelly and Anthony Marra, Carpenter's other supervisor, had 
warned Carpenter not to file Carpenter I,205 the district court 
ruled that those statements were relevant only to the 
Carpenter I litigation.206 By doing so, the court converted an 
issue of fact into one of law. Given the "contentious nature of 
Carpenter p'207 and the comments of both Kelly and Marra, a 
jury logically could infer that the warnings issued by 
Carpenter's superiors, which she failed to heed, influenced her 
subsequent performance evaluation. 
Second, in affirming the district court's denial of 
Carpenter's request for discovery on her evaluation downgrade, 
the D.C. Circuit quoted from Anthony Marra's affidavit. Marra 
stated that the attorneys "who received ratings of 5 or 5-
exemplified [the high standards of the Legal Department], and 
their contributions clearly exceeded that of their peers.''208 The 
court accepted Marra's statement as conclusive proof of a 
disputed factual issue: whether retaliation accounted for 
Carpenter's downgrade. Even more surprising was the D.C. 
Circuit's failure to berate the trial court for making credibility 
determinations on a motion for summary judgment.2o9 Yet, 
Kelly and Marra certainly had reason to retaliate against 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 234. 
204. Id. at 237. 
205. Kelly told Carpenter "'not to cut off [her] nose to spite [her] face,'" and 
"Marra told her to 'drop' her claim .... " Id. at 234 (quoting the trial court). 
206. See id. at 235. 
207. Id. at 237. 
208. Id. (citation omitted). 
209. At the summary judgment stage, credibility determinations, which 
necessarily involve a factual assessment of a witness's testimony, are 
inappropriate. See, e.g., Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that the district court had "quite clearly invaded the province of 
the jury" by granting summary judgment for the defendant because "the task 
of determining the credibility of a witness is the exclusive domain of the finder 
of fact"); see generally McGinley, supra note 133, at 237-41 (discussing 
improper determinations of credibility by some federal courts at the summary 
judgment stage). 
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Carpenter. Both supervisors had warned Carpenter not to file 
suit, and Carpenter alleged that both had lied during her first 
lawsuit against Fannie Mae.210 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, denying 
Carpenter the opportunity to present her evidence to a jury. 
While troubling, the decision in Carpenter II is consistent 
with the meritocracy myth's basic assumption that merit, not 
discrimination, drives employers' hiring and promotion 
decisions. Limiting a plaintiffs ability to prove retaliation by 
labeling evidence as irrelevant, or by accepting, on a motion for 
summary judgment, an employer's self-serving statements as 
conclusive proof of contested facts restricts the number of cases 
in which a plaintiff can potentially prevail. By doing so, the 
courts legitimize employers' decisions and reinforce the belief 
that individual failings, such as lack of litigation experience, 
rather than systemic flaws, like employer retaliation or 
discrimination, account for the differential outcomes observed 
in the workplace. 
3. Evidence of Discriminatory Remarks or Attitudes in the 
Workplace 
Some federal courts limit the plaintiffs ability to use 
evidence of racist and sexist remarks and attitudes in the 
workplace in making out a circumstantial case of intentional 
discrimination. By concluding that certain discriminatory 
remarks and attitudes are not relevant to a determination of 
unlawful intent, these courts convert contested issues of fact 
into issues of law. By doing so, they increase the employer's 
chances for winning on summary judgment and limit the cases 
in which plaintiffs prevail on disparate treatment claims based 
on circumstantial evidence. 
a. Discriminatory Remarks by Supervisors 
Boyd v. State Farm Insurance Cos. 2II illustrates how 
labeling racist and sexist comments by supervisors as "stray 
remarks"212 in the workplace converts a factual issue of 
employer intent into a legal issue, in turn, making it easier for 
federal courts to grant summary judgment in the employer's 
210. Carpenter, 174 F.3d at 234. 
211. 158 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1051 (1999). 
212. The "stray remark" language comes from Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse u. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989). 
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favor.213 Boyd involved a lawsuit by Jimmy Boyd, a black man, 
against State Farm, his employer, for race discrimination for 
failing to promote him to the position of Supervisor IV.214 State 
Farm relied on Boyd's December 1994 Performance Planning 
and Review Evaluation (PPR) to justify its promotion 
decision.21s Boyd's supervisor, Bruce Sutton, a white male, 
prepared the 1994 PPR, "which was not as favorable as Boyd's 
past reviews."216 Sutton, however, had been disciplined during 
the prior year for calling Boyd "Buckwheat" at a firm social 
213. See, e.g., Simmons v. Oce-USA, Inc., 174 F.3d 913, 915-16 (8th Cir. 
1999) (affirming an order granting summary judgment for the employer on a 
race discrimination claim, even though the supervisor who had referred to the 
plaintiff as "Buckwheat" was responsible for the plaintiff's adverse 
performance evaluations, on which the employer based its decision to 
terminate the plaintiffs employment); Gartman v. Gencorp, Inc., 120 F.3d 127, 
129-131 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing the trial court's denial of the employer's 
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs sex discrimination 
claim, concluding that the division president's comment that the plaintiff did 
not know "how to belly up to the bar" was not a gender-based remark and that 
the division vice president's comment "S--t, another gal" in response to the 
firm's naming a woman to monitor supplier quality was not relevant, having 
been made several months before the adverse employment action); Harris v. 
Parker Hannifin Corp., No. 1:97-CV-254-B-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13526, at 
*8-9 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 19, 1998) (granting summary judgment to the employer 
on a race discrimination claim, noting that the discriminatory remarks of two 
white supervisors and the hostility of white co-workers were "irrelevant to the 
issue of pretext" because neither supervisor had participated in the hiring 
decision and the firm's management had not exhibited hostility toward the 
plaintifl); cf. Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(affirming the trial court's entry of judgment as a matter of law on the 
plaintiffs sex discrimination claim for failure to send her to the Police 
Academy, concluding that the plaintiff could not use a mixed-motive analysis 
because a statement by the plaintiffs supervisor, the Chief of the University 
police, that "'he was never going to send a female to the [Police] Academy'" was 
made "in response to [another officer's question] as to whether [the plaintiff] 
would be joining him in attending the Police Academy" [and, thus, did not] 
'"bear directly on the contested employment decision'" (citation omitted)), cert. 
denied, 120 S. Ct. 1243 (2000). Compare Paulsboe v. Farnam Cos., No. 97-
7003, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19990, *8-9 (lOth Cir. Aug. 1, 1997) (concluding 
that a supervisor's concern about the plaintiff's willingness to drink and 
socialize with clients, which the supervisor described "as being 'one of the 
guys,'" was not a gender-based comment), with GLASS CEILING REPORT, supra 
note 24, at 28 ("'What's important is comfort, chemistry, relationships, and 
collaborations .... When we find minorities and women who think like we do, 
we snatch them up.'" (citation omitted)). 
214. Boyd also sued for wrongful termination pursuant to the Family and 
Medical Leave Act. See Boyd, 158 F.3d at 328. 
215. See id. at 329. 
216. Id. at 327-28. 
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event.217 Boyd also alleged that Sutton had called him a "Porch 
Monkey'' on another occasion. 218 
The district court granted summary judgment for State 
Farm, concluding that the "Buckwheat" comment was "a stray 
remark from which no reasonable fact-finder could infer race 
discrimination."219 The Fifth Circuit agreed. Labeling Sutton's 
comments as "isolated remarks," the court concluded that Boyd 
had failed to "provide evidence of a causal connection"220 
between the remarks and State Farm's failure to promote him. 
The decision in Boyd is disturbing for several reasons. 
First, both the trial court and the Fifth Circuit in Boyd 
misapplied the "stray remarks" language from Justice 
O'Connor's concurring op1mon in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins. 221 Hopkins was a "mixed motive" case, which is a 
direct, not circumstantial, evidence case.222 In fact, Justice 
O'Connor's famous "stray remarks" language directly follows 
her discussion of when the burden shifts to the employer in a 
case in which a disparate treatment plaintiff has shown "by 
direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial 
factor in the [challenged employment] decision."223 Justice 
O'Connor did not say that "stray remarks" were not probative 
of intent in circumstantial evidence cases, where plaintiffs 
weave together various pieces of evidence to create an inference 
of discrimination.224 Moreover, Hopkins involved an appeal 
217. I d. at 327. 
218. Id. at 329. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 330; see Simmons v. Oce-USA, Inc., 174 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 
1999) (concluding that a supervisor's racist comments were not related to the 
employer's decision to terminate the plaintiff, because the plaintiff failed to 
establish "a causal link between the racial comments and the adverse 
employment decision"); Rhone v. Tex. Dep't of Trans., CA3:96-CV-1147-BC, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22911, at *16-17 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 1997) (stating that 
a supervisor's admission he had likely used the term "nigger," employee's 
deposition testimony that she had heard the supervisor use the word "nigger," 
and supervisor's comment about the playing of "jungle music" at company 
events were "nothing more than unfortunate stray remarks" that the court 
would not consider "because there [was] no connection between the alleged 
racist remarks ... and the challenged employment action" (citations omitted)). 
221. 490 U.S. 228, 276-77 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
222. See supra note 130. 
223. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 276-277 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
224. In fact, Justice O'Connor stated that "stray remarks in the workplace, 
while perhaps probative of sexual harassment cannot justify requiring the 
employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on 
legitimate criteria." Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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from a trial court decision on the merits. Thus, it clearly does 
not stand for the proposition that federal courts can determine, 
at the summary judgment stage, that racist and sexist remarks 
are legally irrelevant to a determination of discriminatory 
intent in a circumstantial evidence case. 
Second, by deciding that Sutton's racist remarks could not 
support an inference of discriminatory intent, the Fifth Circuit 
.resolved the central factual issue in a disparate treatment case 
on a motion for summary judgment.22s In circumstantial 
evidence cases, the fact finder weaves together pieces of 
evidence in order to create the necessary inference of unlawful 
intent. But the Fifth Circuit concluded that a reasonable fact 
finder could not infer discriminatory intent from Sutton's racist 
remarks. This conclusion is open to debate. After all, State 
Farm did not promote Boyd based on Sutton's adverse 
evaluation, which followed Sutton's discipline for calling Boyd 
"Buckwheat." A reasonable jury certainly could draw the 
necessary inference of discriminatory animus from this 
sequence of events. 
Third, overtly racist and sexist comments are much ·less 
common in today's workplace. A decline in traditional 
prejudice accounts, in part, for this change in behavior. 226 But, 
in addition, voicing such views is considered socially 
unacceptable.227 Employers also are aware that overt racist 
and sexist remarks may constitute direct evidence of 
discrimination. 228 As a consequence, it is unlikely that 
supervisors will repeatedly make overtly racist and sexist 
comments on the job. It is unclear, then, why even "isolated" 
discriminatory remarks are not considered probative of a 
supervisor's attitudes towards black or female employees. The 
Boyd court's dismissal of the "Buckwheat" and "Porch Monkey'' 
comments as "isolated" utterances ignores the ways in which 
workplace norms have changed over the past thirty years. , 
225. Other courts have engaged in a similar analysis. See supra note 190 
and accompanying text. 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 73-7 4. 
227. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 7, at 6 ("Because of current 
cultural values . . . most whites . . . have convictions concerning fairness, 
justice, and racial equality."); Dovidio, supra note 77 (suggesting that overt 
racism has changed to a more subtle form of aversive racism, in which overt 
hostility is rare, but discrimination still manifests itself in an indirect 
fashion). 
228. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
638 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:587 
Finally, it is unclear why racist remarks, even when 
removed in time from the adverse employment decision, are not 
probative of the employer's intent. This conclusion is premised 
on the assumption that racist comments do not reflect racist 
beliefs, or perhaps that an employer's beliefs, notwithstanding 
earlier racist comments, have changed in the interim. The 
research on the persistence of stereotypes, however, belies both 
assumptions. 229 
b. Discriminatory Remarks by Co-Workers and Discriminatory 
Workplace Attitudes 
When plaintiffs take one step back and offer evidence of 
discriminatory remarks by, or biased attitudes of, co-workers, 
the courts are even more hesitant to allow plaintiffs to use such 
evidence as part of their circumstantial cases.230 Ferron v. 
229. See Devine & Elliot, supra note 180, at 1147 (noting the difficulty, 
even for low-prejudiced individuals, of "'breaking the prejudice habit"' because 
of the ingrained nature of cultural beliefs about the inferiority of blacks 
(citation omitted)); see also supra Part I.C. for a discussion of how 
discrimination operates in subtle ways. 
230. See, e.g., Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 608-10 
(4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a remark by the employer club's greens 
superintendent that he would have a problem working for a woman was not 
connected to the employer's decision to terminate the female plaintiff, even 
though the employer did so, in part, because of problems the plaintiff 
encountered in supervising the greens superintendent); Romero v. Banco 
Popular de P.R., 35 F. Supp. 2d 195, 199 (D.P.R. 1999) (granting summary 
judgment for the employer on the plaintiffs race and national origin claims, 
noting that sworn statements by past and current supervisors that the 
employer had unwritten rules about not promoting black candidates do not 
constitute evidence of discriminatory intent because "[g]eneral charges of 
discrimination ... do not create a 'case or controversy"'), affd in part, vacated 
in part, 212 F.3d 607 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming the decision as to failure to 
promote and constructive termination claims, but remanding on a race-based 
harassment charge); Holmes v. Fed. Aviation Admin., NO. 98-5071 (JEI), 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14955, at *23 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1999) (granting summary 
judgment to the employer on race, age, and retaliation claims, concluding that 
the employer's "Glass Ceiling Report," which found that some minorities 
believed that non-minority males received better support and advancement 
opportunities, was not relevant to the issue of pretext because the report could 
be "characterized as evidence of the [employer's] commitment to ensuring a 
diverse workplace"); Ford v. Sheriff-Coroner's Dep't, No. C-97-3396 VRW, 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19912, at *23-24 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1998) ("The fact that 
certain officers, none of whom was responsible for making the decision 
whether to promote plaintiff, may have sexually harassed women, including 
plaintiff, does not suggest that the explanation offered by other officers, those 
who were responsible for the decision, is a pretext for discrimination."); cf. 
Tidwell v. County of Riverside, No. 96-56219, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34833, at 
*3 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 1997) (holding that evidence of racial jokes and remarks at 
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West231 provides a good example of the federal courts' 
reluctance to consider evidence of discriminatory workplace 
attitudes as part of the plaintiffs circumstantial proof of the 
employer's discriminatory intent. Kenneth Ferron, a black 
firefighter, sued the United States Army, his employer, for race 
discrimination stemming from the Army's decision not to 
promote him to a GS-6 or GS-7 position at its Fort Stewart Fire 
Department (Fort Stewart). 232 The Army promoted five white 
male applicants to the available GS-6 and GS-7 positions.233 
The Army based its decision not to promote Ferron on 
evaluations provided by his supervisors.234 Evaluating 
supervisors commented that Ferron "sat 'around doing 
nothing,"' lacked the initiative and motivation of other 
candidates, and "'always needed guidance and supervision."'235 
As a result, KH. V anderArk, who made the promotion 
decisions, determined that Ferron was not yet "'ready to take 
over a leadership position within the department."'236 
Ferron attacked the Army's evaluations as subjective and a 
"mask for racial preferences.''237 He presented evidence that 
V anderArk had made fifteen promotion decisions at Fort 
Stewart, none of which involved the promotion of a black 
candidate.238 In addition, VanderArk's testimony suggested, 
although not conclusively, that he had inherited a "good old 
boy," "racially motivated" employment system at Fort 
Stewart.239 
a building permit office failed to show "the existence of racially discriminatory 
licensing policies" sufficient to sustain the plaintiffs' Equal Protection Clause 
claim). But cf. Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 521 (3d Cir. 
1997) ("Although stray remarks by non-decisionmakers alone are insufficient 
to establish discriminatory intent, we have held that such remarks still can 
constitute evidence of the atmosphere in which the employment decision was 
carried out, and therefore can be relevant to the question of retaliation." 
(citations omitted)). 
231. 10 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Ga. 1998). 
232. Id. at 1365. 
233. Id. at 1367. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. (citations omitted). 
236. Id. (citation omitted). 
237. Id. at 1369. 
238. Id. at 1368. 
239. Id. VanderArk first acknowledged that Hunter Army Airfield, where 
he previously had worked, had a "better balance of hiring and practices" than 
Fort Stewart. Id. He said he was not certain that the Fort Stewart system 
had been "racially motivated." Id. But VanderArk then said he had been at 
Fort Stewart for only one year, he could not fix the system "overnight," and he 
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In granting the Army's motion for summary judgment, the 
court improperly concluded, as a matter of law, that Ferron's 
evidence of workplace discrimination would not suffice to create 
an inference of discriminatory inte:q.t on the part of his 
employer. First, VanderArk's testimony about the employment 
practices at Fort Stewart was ambiguous. As a result, Ferron 
should have had the opportunity at trial to seek clarification, 
through cross-examination, of VanderArk's perceptions of the 
employment system at Fort Stewart.240 In addition, the court 
accepted, as a matter oflaw, VanderArk's assertion that he had 
acted impartially in making the challenged promotion 
decisions. But weighing the credibility of an employer's 
evidence is improper at the summary judgment stage.241 
Credibility determinations rest within the province of the fact 
finder. 
Second, a reasonable jury could conclude based on the 
circumstantial evidence presented that the Army had 
discriminated against Ferron. The Army based its promotion 
decision on subjective evaluations of Ferron's ability. Research 
shows that "whites tend to evaluate blacks less favorably than 
whites on subjective dimensions of work performance."242 
Moreover, some of the criticisms voiced in Ferron's evaluations 
reflect negative stereotypes associated with black Americans. 243 
For example, some supervisors complained that Ferron "sat 
'around doing nothing"' and was less motivated than other 
candidates, comments suggesting that Ferron was lazier than 
the white applicants, a stereotype often applied to black 
employees.244 If VanderArk inherited a racially motivated, 
was only explaining "what [he] inherited" at Fort Stewart. Id. VanderArk 
also noted that he was not "one oftheir good old boys out there." Id. 
The court issued Ferron's attorney a "strong warning" for "distorting by 
omission" VanderArk's comments about the employment system at Fort 
Stewart. Id. at 1371. 
240. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1071-
72 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane) ("In making [its] finding [that an inference of 
discrimination is warranted], the jury must perform its traditional function of 
assessing the weight of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses through 
observation of both direct testimony and cross-examination at trial, and the 
strength of the inferences that can be drawn from the elements of the prima 
facie case and the evidence that undermines the employer's proffered reasons 
for its actions." (citations omitted)). 
241. See McGinley, supra note 133, at 237-41. 
242. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 7, at 18 (citation omitted). 
243. See Devine & Elliot, supra note 180, at 1139. 
244. See id. at 1146 tbl.3. 
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good old boy system, then race discrimination could account for 
Ferron's lower evaluations, which formed the basis of the 
employer's decision not to promote him. 
Third, the court in Ferron ignored the impact of workplace 
attitudes on supervisory decisions. The· rational bias theory 
posits that "individuals who do not themselves hold negative 
prejudices may nonetheless 'rationally' choose to 
discriminate . . . if they believe those in power over them and 
their careers expect or approve of such behavior, particularly if 
the organizational climate is one in which discrimination 
appears to be the norm.''245 The rational bias theory places 
VanderArk's decision and the court's justification for that 
determination in a new light. V anderArk denied being "one of 
[the] good old boys out there,''246 claiming he made an impartial 
decision on Ferron's promotion. In addition, the court noted 
that V anderArk had promoted five black employees during his 
tenure at Hunter Army Airfield, where he had worked before 
coming to Fort Stewart. 247 The court used this information to 
rebut Ferron's evidence that VanderArk had failed to promote 
any black employees at Fort Stewart.248 Yet Ferron's evidence 
is consistent with the rational bias theory. Even if V anderArk 
were not personally biased against black employees, he might 
choose to promote only white candidates in a system he 
perceived as rewarding such behavior. "[A] supervisor might 
discriminate racially in job assignments in order to placate the 
prejudice pervasive in the labor force. Instances of this variety 
of the heckler's veto would be consciously intended to further 
the employer's interests by preserving peace in the 
workplace."249 VanderArk admitted that there "always [had] 
been a better balance of hiring and practices at Hunter" than at 
245. Susan Trentham & Laurie Larwood, Gender Discrimination and the 
Workplace: An Examination of Rational Bias Theory, 38 SEX ROLES 1, 2 (1998) 
(citations omitted). 
246. Ferron v. West, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1368 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (citation 
omitted). 
247. See id. at 1368 n.5. 
248. See id. 
249. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998); see also 
Derasmo v. City of Gainesville, 78 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384, 390-91 
(N.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1998) ("[T]he record is replete with comments and actions 
by the male supervisors and co-workers which reveal that they did not 
approve or enjoy having female firefighters in the force. These comments 
supply a reason why the employer may have been motivated to terminate 
plaintiff and then devise a pretextual reason for the termination."). 
642 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:587 
Fort Stewart.2so Thus, he may have promoted black employees 
at Hunter and not done so at Fort Stewart because he 
recognized that Fort Stewart operated as a "good old boy's" 
network,251 where race discrimination was tolerated. 
A trier of fact faced with evidence of discriminatory 
workplace attitudes, as in Ferron, or racist remarks, as in 
Boyd, certainly might conclude, after hearing all of the 
evidence, that race discrimination did not motivate the 
challenged employment decision. The problem is that the 
federal courts are not allowing plaintiffs to make these 
arguments to the trier of fact. Instead, an alarming number of 
federal courts are making these factual determinations of 
discriminatory intent on employer motions for summary 
judgment. 252 By doing so, they send a message to employers: do 
not worry about evidence of bias in the workplace so long as 
supervisory personnel responsible for decisions do not use 
racist or sexist language near the time of hiring or promotion 
decisions. This message, in turn, creates a disincentive for 
employers to take affirmative steps to eliminate such bias in 
the workplace. 
D. THE "CLEARLY BETTER QUALIFIED" REQUIREMENT 
In both the Fifth and the Tenth Circuits, a plaintiff cannot 
survive an employer's motion for summary judgment simply by 
producing evidence that she is more qualified than the 
candidate selected by the employer.253 The Fifth Circuit 
requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that she is "clearly"254 better 
250. Ferron, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1368. 
251. See id. 
252. See supra notes 190, 213, 230, and accompanying text (providing case 
citations to many of these cases); see also supra note 140 and accompanying 
text (explaining the results of the LEXIS search that formed the basis of this 
Article). 
253. See Rutherford v. Harris County, 197 F.3d 173, 182 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(clarifYing the Fifth Circuit precedent on the issue of comparative 
qualifications by noting that unless a plaintiffs evidence establishes that her 
qualifications are so superior to the person selected as to "jump off the page," 
the court's belief that the employer selected a less qualified person for the job, 
by itself, does not establish pretext); Paulsboe v. Farnam Cos., No. 97-7003, 
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19990, at *8 (lOth Cir. Aug. 1, 1997) ("Absent evidence 
that one candidate is 'overwhelmingly better qualified,' pretext cannot be 
shown simply by comparing plaintiffs qualifications with those of the 
successful applicant." (citations omitted)). 
254. E.g., Deines v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Reg. Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 
279 (5th Cir. 1999) ("We reemphasize the general rule that differences in 
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qualified than the candidate selected for the position. 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit requires proof that the plaintiff is 
"clearly"255 or "overwhelmingly''256 better qualified than the 
person the employer chose for the job. By doing so, these courts 
have increased the quantum of evidence that a plaintiff must 
produce to create an inference of discriminatory intent. 
This standard is especially troubling on motions for 
summary judgment. Because the ultimate issue in a disparate 
treatment case involves the employer's intent, courts should be 
wary of granting summary judgment in employment 
discrimination cases.257 Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the 
clear superiority of their qualifications makes it more difficult 
to survive a motion for summary judgment and deprives 
plaintiffs of the opportunity to present their case to the 
ultimate fact finder.zss 
qualifications between job candidates are generally not probative evidence of 
discrimination unless those differences are so favorable to the plaintiff that 
there can be no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment that 
the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position at issue."). 
255. E.g., Simms v. Oklahoma, 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (lOth Cir. 1999) 
(stating that, when a plaintiff is not "clearly better qualified" than the 
candidate selected, the employer has discretion to select between the 
candidates), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 53 (1999). 
256. E.g., Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1319 (lOth 
Cir. 1999) ("The disparity in qualifications must be 'overwhelming' to be 
evidence of pretext." (citations omitted)); Birge v. Apfel, No. 97-2158, 1998 
U.S. App. LEXIS 6605, at *13 (lOth Cir. Apr. 2, 1998) (holding that the 
plaintiff failed to produce evidence "that she was overwhelmingly better 
qualified than the other candidates"); Ning v. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 
No. 96-6372, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12615, at *8 (lOth Cir. May 30, 1997) 
("Absent evidence that one candidate is 'overwhelmingly better qualified,' 
pretext cannot be shown simply by comparing plaintiff's qualifications with 
those of the successful applicant." (citation omitted)). 
257. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. 
258. E.g., Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1319-22 (affirming an order granting 
summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff's disparate treatment 
claims of sex and age discrimination and noting, in part, that the plaintiff 
failed to provide evidence that she was "overwhelmingly better qualified" than 
the candidates selected by the employer); Simms, 165 F.3d at 1330-31 
(affirming an order granting summary judgment for the employer on the 
plaintiff's race discrimination claim, noting that the plaintiff "provide[d] no 
evidence that he was so clearly better qualified than [the candidate selected] 
that a jury could reasonably conclude that [the employer] based its decision on 
something other than the proffered reason"); Birge, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 
6605, at *13-15 (affirming an order granting summary judgment for the 
employer on the plaintiffs sex discrimination claim, in part, because the 
plaintiff had not "presented evidence that she was overwhelmingly better 
qualified than the other candidates"); Harris v. Parker Hanifin Corp., No. 
1:97-CV-254-B-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13526, at *8-10 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 24, 
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Moreover, nothing in the framework established by the 
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,259 and 
refined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine260 and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,261 compels the 
conclusion that plaintiffs must present evidence of clearly-
superior qualifications. 262 It would not be inconsistent for a 
court adhering to the pretext-plus standard, such as the Fifth 
Circuit, to also adopt a heightened standard for qualifications. 
Both standards raise the bar for plaintiffs, thus limiting the 
cases in which plaintiffs can create an actionable claim of 
discrimination. But, it is unclear why a circuit, like the Tenth, 
which professes to follow the more lenient "pretext-only" 
approach, 263 would raise the quantum of proof that a plaintiff 
must present with regard to her qualifications in order to 
survive a motion for summary judgment. 
Yet, this is exactly what the Tenth Circuit did in Paulsboe 
v. Farnam Cos. 264 In that case, Connie Paulsboe, a white 
woman, sued her employer for sex discrimination stemming 
from the employer's decision to promote a white man to 
regional sales manager, a position for which Paulsboe also had 
applied.265 In reviewing the district court's order granting 
summary judgment for the employer, the Tenth Circuit noted 
that "[a] showing of pretext, in itself, is all that is required to 
raise the inference of discriminatory intent, no additional 
showing of actual discriminatory animus is necessary."266 
1998) (affirming an order granting summary judgment for the employer on a 
race discrimination claim, noting that the plaintiffs claim that she was better 
qualified for the position did not establish pretext because she had not 
produced "sufficient evidence to create a jury issue as to whether she [was] 
clearly better qualified than [the candidate selected]"); see also Nichols v. 
Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 568-70 (5th Cir. 1998) (reversing a jury verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff on a sex discrimination claim, noting, in part, that the plaintiff 
"failed to show that she was clearly better qualified than [the selected 
candidate] with respect to any of the listed selection criteria" (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted)). 
259. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
260. 450 u.s. 248 (1981). 
261. 509 u.s. 502 (1993). 
262. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions in McDonnell 
Douglas and Burdine, see text accompanying notes 129-35 and 142-49. For an 
analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks, see infra text accompanying 
notes 304-15. 
263. See infra note 307 and accompanying text. 
264. No. 97-7003, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19990 (lOth Cir. Aug.l, 1997). 
265. Id. at *2-3. 
266. Id. at *5 (citing Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451-52, n.17 
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Thus, while Paulsboe did not have to satisfy the more rigorous 
"pretext-plus" standard, she did have to demonstrate that she 
was overwhelmingly better qualified for the job. "Absent 
evidence that one candidate is 'overwhelmingly better 
qualified,' pretext cannot be shown simply by comparing 
plaintiffs qualifications with those of the successful 
applicant.''267 Because Paulsboe proved unable to produce such 
evidence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's 
order.268 
The problem with this requirement is that it is very 
difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are more 
qualified than the candidate selected by the employer.269 
Employers normally hire and promote on the basis of multiple 
criteria. As a result, an employer can always point to at least 
one criterion, which it claims is critical to the position, on 
which the plaintiff is weaker than the candidate selected. 
Requiring plaintiffs to prove clearly-superior qualifications, 
especially on motions for summary judgment, significantly 
reduces the number of cases that will proceed to trial. This 
limits the types of cases in which a finding of employment 
discrimination occurs, which, in turn, is consistent with the 
meritocracy myth's central assumption that discrimination in 
the workplace is a "thing of the past." 
E. THE "HONEST BELIEF" STANDARD 
As the Supreme Court aptly noted in United States Postal 
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,21° there "seldom [is] 
'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental 
processes."271 The burden-shifting framework established by 
the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green212 
exists because plaintiffs often do not have evidence of their 
employers' subjective beliefs and motivations. 273 Yet, a growing 
number of federal courts now require plaintiffs not only to 
prove that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
was objectively false, but also that the employer did not 
(lOth Cir. 1995), which had rejected the pretext-plus approach). 
267. Id. at *8 (citations omitted). 
268. Id. at *2. 
269. See supra text accompanying notes 170-76. 
270. 460 u.s. 711 (1983). 
271. Id. at 716. 
272. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
273. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text. 
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honestly believe the reason it proffered for the challenged 
employment decision. 274 This so-called "honest belief' standard 
has made it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to prevail on an 
employer's motion for summary judgment absent direct 
evidence of the employer's discriminatory intent. 275 Two cases, 
274. See, e.g., Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 
(lOth Cir. 1999) ("The relevant inquiry is not whether [the employer's] 
proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether [the employer] 
honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs."); 
Bibbs v. Bd. of Trustees, No. 98-3029, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18303, at *11 
(7th Cir. July 30, 1999) ("Even if [the employer's] belief was wrong, his action 
was not discriminatory as long as he honestly held that belief." (citations 
omitted)); Fischbach v. D.C. Dep't ofCorr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
("Once the employer has articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its 
action . . . the issue is not 'the correctness or desirability of [the] reasons 
offered . . . [but] whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it 
offers.'" (citations omitted)); Mandavilli v. Maldonado, 38 F. Supp. 2d 180, 200 
(D.P.R. 1999) ("When assessing evidence of pretext, the issue is not whether 
Defendants' asserted reasons are 'real, but merely whether the 
decisionmakers ... believed them to be real.'" (citation omitted)); Byrnie v. 
Town of Cromwell Pub. Sch., 73 F. Supp. 2d 204, 214 (D. Conn. 1999) 
("However, even if we were to assume that the Selection Committee misjudged 
plaintiff's qualifications, this would not preclude summary judgment in this 
case, for the relevant inquiry in a disparate treatment case is not whether 
defendants' proffered reasons were wise, or fair, or correct, but whether 
defendants honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those 
beliefs."); Meng v. Ipanema Shoe Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 392, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) ('"A reason honestly described but poorly founded is not a pretext, as 
that term is used in the law of discrimination."' (citation omitted)); Oliver v. 
United States Dep't of Def., 44 F. Supp. 2d 821, 826 (W.D. Tex. 1999) ("The 
relevant inquiry in any case is not whether the employer's evaluations were 
wise or correct, but whether they were honestly held and free of 
discriminatory bias." (citation omitted)); Bickerstaffv. Nordstrom, Inc., 48 F. 
Supp. 2d 790, 800 (N.D. TIL 1999) ("If an employee making hiring decisions 
honestly believes that the decisions are based on nondiscriminatory reasons, 
the reasons are not pretextual." (citation omitted)). 
275. See, e.g., Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1308, 1318 (affirming an order 
granting summary judgment to the employer on the plaintiff's disparate 
treatment claims of sex and age discrimination and retaliation and noting that 
"even if we were to assume that United misjudged Ms. Bullington's 
qualifications, such evidence would not preclude summary judgment in this 
case" because "[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether United's proffered reasons 
were wise, fair or correct but whether United honestly believed those 
reasons"); Bibbs, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18303, at *11 ("The relative 
mediocrity of the 1995 evaluation also indicates that [the plaintiff's 
supervisor], whether rightly or wrongly, had come to believe that [the 
plaintiff] was not sufficiently qualified to perform the duties of administrative 
assistant. Even if [the supervisor's] belief was wrong, his action was not 
discriminatory as long as he honestly held that belief." (citations omitted)); 
Carpenter v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 174 F.3d 231, 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (affirming an order granting summary judgment for the employer on the 
white female plaintiff's retaliation claim and denying remand for discovery, 
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citing favorably to circuit precedent providing that a court's analysis of pretext 
"is not [about the] correctness of [the] employer's reasons but whether [the 
employer] honestly believes them" (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 
184 (1999); Milton v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 97-3166, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 
17932, at *9-10 (7th Cir. July 29, 1998) (affirming an order granting summary 
judgment for the employer on a race discrimination claim, explaining that the 
plaintiff had done "little to convince [the court] that the Park District did not 
honestly believe in its reason for not re-hiring him"); Ellis v. Blood Sys., Inc., 
No. 95-2114, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 15643, at *12 (7th Cir. June 25, 1996) 
("[E]vidence of [the plaintiffs] fine interpersonal skills ... is insufficient to 
enable a jury to rationally conclude that [her employer] did not honestly 
believe that [her] interpersonal skills were not as good as the others."); Booker 
v. Dayton Hudson Corp., No. 98 C 0737, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16241, at *22-
23 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1999) (granting the employer's motion for summary 
judgment on the plaintiffs sex and pregnancy discrimination claims, noting 
that "[t]he relevant inquiry is thus not whether plaintiff actually violated 
company policy, but rather whether the company honestly believed she did"); 
Priester v. WMAQ A.M. Radio, No. 97 C 7959, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8322, at 
*36 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 1999) ("As long as Defendants honestly believed that 
other candidates were more qualified than Priester for the various full-time 
openings, Priester cannot establish pretext for either age or race 
discrimination."); Cooper v. Diversicare Mgmt. Servs. Co., NO. 98-W-194-S, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9138, at *26 (M.D. Ala. May 10, 1999) (granting the 
employer's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs race discrimination 
claim because even if the plaintiffs testimony established that the employer 
was mistaken when it terminated the plaintiff based on violations of the 
employer's rules, the plaintiff had failed to offer sufficient evidence that the 
employer "did not believe plaintiff had committed the charged violations of the 
employer's rules"); Buchanan v. Tower Auto., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 644, 659 
(E.D. Wis. 1999) (granting summary judgment for the employer on the 
plaintiffs' race discrimination claims because "[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that 
the plaintiffs are correct in their view that they were as qualified as those who 
were interviewed (or more qualified than one interviewee), such 'evidence' 
does not go to the question of [the selecting official's] belief that, in her mind, 
the three candidates that she had selected were the most qualified"), affd, 
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26647 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 1999); Jennings v. Nat'! R.R. 
Passenger Corp., No. 97 C 6385, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12004, at *23 (N.D. Ill. 
July 30, 1998) ("Regardless of the accuracy of these statements, this evidence 
does not demonstrate Ziethan did not honestly believe the reasons he gave for 
selecting Beckett for inventory administrator."); Hughes v. Ala. Dep't of Pub. 
Safety, 994 F. Supp 1395, 1399-1401 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (granting summary 
judgment to the employer on the plaintiff's race discrimination claim because 
even though the plaintiff could present evidence discrediting the statements of 
two department employees included in a report that formed the basis of the 
department's challenged employment decisions, the plaintiff could not 
discredit the department's articulated reason that it honestly had relied on the 
report in denying the plaintiff a promotion and in demoting him), affd, 166 
F.3d 353 (11th Cir. 1998); James v. Sheehan [sic], No. 95 C 1789, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1890, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 1997) (noting that the court's role, 
even on motions for summary judgment, is not to evaluate "the wisdom of the 
[employer's] reason, but the genuineness of the [employer's] motives"), affd, 
137 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 
806 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[The honest belief] rule, as developed in a series of 
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Hughes v. Koppers Industries, Inc. 216 and Bell v. EPA,211 
illustrate how the ''honest belief' standard, even in pretext-only 
circuits, 278 transforms the circumstantial evidence case into one 
requiring direct evidence of discriminatory intent. 
In Hughes, Cornell Hughes, a black man, filed suit against 
Koppers Industries, his employer, for failure to promote him to 
the position of laboratory supervisor at Koppers's chemical 
plant.279 Koppers selected Gregory Traczek, a white man, for 
the position.280 Hughes clearly had more experience than did 
Traczek, both within the industry and with the firm. Hughes 
had worked in the chemical industry for nineteen years and 
with Koppers for more than five years.281 Traczek, who 
received the promotion, had only four years of industry 
experience, all at Koppers. 282 Hughes, unlike Traczek, had 
discharged "all of the functions of supervisor."283 Hughes also 
had trained some of his co-workers, including Traczek. 284 
Koppers claimed that it hired Traczek because he had earned a 
college degree and because he had good leadership skills, 
effective oral and written communication skills, and could 
manage his workload under pressure and work without 
supervision. 285 The trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Koppers and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 286 
Although Hughes's qualifications, in terms of industry, 
firm and supervisory experience, clearly exceeded those of 
Traczek, Hughes lacked the one objective qualification on 
which the employer based its decision: a college degree.287 The 
Seventh Circuit decisions, provides that so long as the employer honestly 
believed in the proffered reason given for its employment action, the employee 
cannot establish pretext even if the employer's reason is ultimately found to be 
mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless."). 
276. No. 96-2625, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 223 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 1997). 
277. No. 97 C 6349, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16445 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 1999). 
278. The Northern District of illinois, which decided Bell v. EPA, sits in the 
Seventh Circuit, a pretext-only circuit. See infra note 307. 
279. See Hughes, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 223, at *2-3. 
280. Id. at *3. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. at *7. 
286. Id. at *1-2. 
287. Hughes had majored in chemistry in college for two years, but had not 
earned his degree. Traczek had earned a degree in biology. Id. at *7. The 
court did not question how a biology degree would benefit a supervisor in a 
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Seventh Circuit, however, concluded that such large disparities 
in objective qualifications did not even merit a trial. Instead, 
the court explained that the issue in the case was "not whether 
Hughes was more qualified than Traczek, but whether the 
employer could not have honestly believed that Hughes was less 
qualified than Traczek.''288 In other words, the authenticity of 
the employer's belief about the legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason, not the objective truth or falsity of the proffered reason, 
governed the analysis. 
The federal district court in Bell employed a similar 
analysis in order to discount substantial evidence that the 
plaintiffs had objectively superior qualifications to those 
persons selected by the employer for promotion. In Bell, four 
plaintiffs-Bell and Hill, two black women; Prasinos, a Greek 
woman; and Assadi, a 50-year-old Iranian man-alleged that 
the EPA had discriminated against them on the basis of race, 
national origin, and age, respectively.289 The plaintiffs alleged 
that the EPA had discriminated in its decision to promote four 
white employees, instead of the plaintiffs, to four new GS-13 
Master positions in the EPA's Air Enforcement Compliance and 
Assurance division.290 The EPA claimed that it had hired the 
"most qualified candidates" for the GS-13 positions.29I 
The facts, however, belied that assertion. First, each of the 
four plaintiffs had worked for the EPA longer than any one of 
the four white employees selected by the EPA (selected 
employees).292 Second, all four of the plaintiffs had received 
EPA service achievement medals. Bell had received three such 
medals, Assadi and Prasinos had received two medals, and Hill 
had received one medal. 293 Only one of the four selected 
employees had received any EPA service achievement 
chemical plant. See also supra Part II.B. (discussing the erosion of the 
legitimacy requirement). 
288. Hughes, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 223, at *6 (emphasis added). 
289. Bell v. EPA, No. 97 C 6349, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16445, at *4 (N.D. 
ill. Oct. 14, 1999). Plaintiff Hill, an African-American woman, dropped her sex 
discrimination claim. Id. at *9. 
290. Id. at *4. 
291. Id. at *10. 
292. Id. at *13. Assadi had worked for the EPA the longest, having been 
employed since 1980. Id. at *13 n.2. Prasinos and Bell were hired in 1986, 
whereas Hill was hired in 1987. Id. Hamsing and Dart, two of the four 
selected white employees, began work for the EPA in 1987 and 1990, 
respectively. Id. The other two selected employees, Kieth and Keegan, begail 
workfortheEPAin 1991. Id. 
293. Id. at *13. 
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medals. 294 Third, three of the plaintiffs-Assadi, Bell, and 
Prasinos-had engineering experience with firms outside the 
EPA, while none of the four selected employees had such 
experience. 295 Fourth, none of the selected employees had 
experience as an EPA region coordinator, while both Bell and 
Prasinos had served in such a capacity.296 Fifth, both Bell and 
Hill had "developed enforcement tools used by Kieth [one of the 
selected employees], and [had] assisted Kieth in her 
training."297 Finally, the preliminary rankings of the four 
selected employees were comparable to those of the plaintiffs.298 
The court, however, made short shrift of plaintiffs' 
evidence, noting that their attempt to establish pretext through 
comparison of objective qualifications was "misplaced."299 "The 
court's inquiry on the pretext issue is not to compare the 
qualifications of Plaintiffs and Selectees. . . . The issue is 
whether the EPA honestly believed that it promoted the most 
qualified persons for the positions .... "30° The plaintiffs in 
Bell, however, did not have direct evidence of their employer's 
state of mind. As a result, the court granted the EPA's motion 
for summary judgment. 301 
As the decisions in Hughes and Bell illustrate, the "honest 
belief' standard eviscerates the circumstantial evidence case. 
Requiring plaintiffs to prove their employer's state of mind, for 
example, whether beliefs are honestly held, amounts to a 
requirement that the plaintiff present direct evidence of 
discriminatory purpose. How does a plaintiff in a 
circumstantial evidence case ever prove that the employer did 
not honestly believe its reasons for hiring another candidate? 
The standard is even more problematic when applied to 
subjective hiring criteria.302 For example, how does a plaintiff 
294. Kieth had received two EPA service achievement medals. I d. 
295. Id. at *14 n.3. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at *13. Two of the selected employees-Hamsing and Dart-
received a preliminary ranking of 75, as did two of the plaintiffs-Assadi and 
Prasinos. Id. The other two selected employees-Kieth and Keegan-received 
a preliminary ranking of 69, which Bell also received. Id. Hill received a 
preliminary ranking of 63. Id. 
299. See id. at *14. 
300. Id. at *14-15 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
301. See id. at *1. 
302. See, e.g., Ellis v. Blood Sys., Inc., No. 95-2114, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15643, at *11-12 (7th Cir. June 25, 1996) ("[Plaintifil concedes that she 'can 
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demonstrate that her employer did not honestly believe the 
candidate selected had superior interpersonal skills?303 An 
admission by the employer would suffice, but this constitutes 
direct evidence. The entire purpose of using circumstantial 
evidence is to allow plaintiffs to demonstrate by inference, 
rather than by direct proof, the employer's bad intent. The 
"honest belief' standard requires the plaintiff to crawl inside 
the employer's head in order to produce evidence of 
discriminatory intent. By forcing plaintiffs to provide such 
evidence at the summary judgment stage, the federal courts 
employing the ''honest belief' standard effectively ensure that 
few employment discrimination plaintiffs will ever have, their 
day in court. 
F. THE PRETEXT-PLUS PROBLEM 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks,304 a split has existed in the federal circuits305 
about the quantum of proof necessary for a plaintiff to prevail 
on the merits in a case involving only circumstantial evidence 
of employment discrimination. The Court's ambiguous decision 
in Hicks306 paved the way for several circuits to adopt the 
not present direct evidence relating to how well the other candidates 
performed in their interviews.'" (citation omitted)). 
303. See id. at *12 ("[E]vidence of [plaintiffs] fine interpersonal skills ... is 
insufficient to enable a jury to rationally conclude that [her employer] did not 
honestly believe that [her] interpersonal skills were not as good as the others." 
(citation omitted)). 
304. 509 u.s. 502 (1993). 
305. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 
2097, 2104-05 (2000) (O'Connor, J.) (noting, in a unanimous decision, that the 
Court had granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits about whether a 
plaintiff could prevail on the merits in an employment discrimination case by 
only presenting evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination coupled with 
sufficient evidence of pretext). 
306. In Hicks, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that "[t]he 
factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly 
if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the 
elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." 
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. But, as Justice Souter noted in his dissent, the Court's 
decision in Hicks sent "conflicting signals." Id. at 535 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
In a dissent joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens, Justice Souter 
explained that the majority's opinion in Hicks "support[ed] a more extreme 
conclusion, that proof of the falsity of the employer's articulated reasons 
[would] not even be sufficient to sustain a judgment for the plaintiff." Id. As a 
result, in the wake of Hicks, some circuits interpreted the Court's decision as 
requiring evidence of more than pretext in order for an employment 
discrimination plaintiff to prevail on the merits in a circumstantial evidence 
652 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:587 
heightened pretext-plus approach, which required plaintiffs not 
only to demonstrate that their employers' legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason was unworthy of credence or a 
pretext, but also to show that discrimination was the real 
reason for the challenged employment decision. 307 By applying 
case. This created a split in the circuits, which the Supreme Court recently 
resolved in Reeues u. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). 
307. The First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits applied a pretext-plus 
standard, even at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Cuervos 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 22 n.5 (1st Cir. 1999) ("In Hicks, the 
Court made it clear that in order to survive summary judgment, a Title VII 
plaintiff must present sufficient evidence not only that the employer's 
proffered reason is false but also that the real reason is discrimination." 
(citation omitted)); Florence v. United States Vanadium Corp., No. 97-7443, 
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22579, at *6 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1998) (stating that to 
survive an employer's motion for summary judgment plaintiff must show that 
the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is false and a pretext for 
discrimination); Gillins v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., 148 F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 
1998) ("This court has adopted what is best described as the 'pretext-plus' 
standard for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases." 
(citation omitted)); Grimes v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental 
Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that to avoid summary 
judgment the plaintiff must refute the employer's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons and "createD a reasonable inference that race was 
a determinative factor" in the challenged employment decision). 
The remaining circuits did not require plaintiffs to demonstrate both that 
the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext and that 
the real reason for the challenged employment decision was discrimination in 
order to survive an employer motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Aka v. 
Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F. 3d 1284, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en bane) (rejecting 
"any reading of Hicks under which employment discrimination plaintiffs 
would be routinely required to submit evidence over and above rebutting the 
employer's stated explanation in order to avoid summary judgment"); Waldron 
v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 495 (3d Cir. 1995) C"mn Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 
F. 3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), we joined those of our sister circuits who have read 
Hicks to require at summary judgment 'pretext-only.'"); EEOC v. Yenkin-
Majestic Paint Corp., 112 F.3d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the "pretext-plus" standard in Hicks); Mills v. Health 
Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 458 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]o prevail on a 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, [a plaintifi] need not show 
'pretext-plus .... "); Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 
1109 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that an appellate court cannot reverse a jury 
verdict for plaintiff "if (1) the elements of a prima facie case are present, and 
(2) there exists sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to reject the 
defendant's proffered reasons for its actions" (citation omitted)), reh'g denied, 
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 8280 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 946 (1994); 
Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he factfinder in 
a Title VII case is entitled to infer discrimination from plaintiffs proof of a 
prima facie case and showing of pretext without anything more .... "); 
Paulsboe v. Farnam Cos., No. 97-7003, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19990, at *5 
(lOth Cir. Aug. 1, 1997) ("A showing of pretext, in itself, is all that is required 
to raise the inference of discriminatory intent, no additional showing of actual 
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the pretext-plus approach at the summary judgment stage,308 
these circuits made it virtually impossible for plaintiffs without 
direct evidence of discrimination to survive employer motions 
for summary judgment.309 The pretext-plus ·approach 
discriminatory animus is necessary." (citation omitted)); Williams v. Vitro 
Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that an offer of 
sufficient evidence so that the finder of fact disbelieves the employer's 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason suffices to prevent entry of summary 
judgment in an age discrimination case). 
308. See supra note 307. 
309. See, e.g., Rodriquez-Cueruos, 181 F.3d at 22 (affirming an order 
granting summary judgment to the employer on the plaintiffs race and 
national origin claims even though the plaintiff presented evidence that the 
reasons offered for his demotion "may have been inaccurate" and that the 
employer may have treated plaintiff differently than other Wal-Mart 
managers because the plaintiff had failed to offer evidence that Wal-Mart's 
actions were "predicated on the basis of race or national origin" (footnote 
omitted)); Gillins v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., 148 F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming an order granting summary judgment for the employer even though 
Gillins demonstrated that his employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for temporarily demoting him-a hiring freeze-was "'unpersuasive, or even 
obviously contrived'" because Gillins had not offered evidence that race 
discrimination actually motivated the employer's decision (citation omitted)); 
Florence v. United States Vanadium Corp., No. 97-7443, 1998 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22579, at *8 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1998) (affirming an order by the trial court 
granting summary judgment in favor of the employer on a race discrimination 
claim, noting that the employer is not subject to liability under Title VII for 
"misjudg[ing] the relative qualifications" of job candidates, so long as 
employer's judgment is exercised "on a nondiscriminatory basis"); Grimes v. 
Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 
1996) (noting the absence of overt statements on the part of the decision 
maker and upholding an order granting summary judgment for the employer 
on a race discrimination claim, even though (1) the white woman selected for 
the position was later determined to lack minimum educational qualifications 
for the position, and (2) the plaintiff had previously won a race discrimination 
case involving the promotion of the white man in charge of selecting 
candidates for the position involved in the instant lawsuit); Stanley v. Widnall, 
No. 95-1206, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34727, at *13-16 (4th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995) 
(per curiam) (affirming an order granting summary judgment for the employer 
on the black male plaintiffs race discrimination claim for failure to promote 
the plaintiff to one of two Construction Representative (CR) jobs, even though 
(1) the plaintiff ranked second on employer's internally generated list of 
qualified candidates, (2) the plaintiff had received better performance 
evaluations than one of two white male candidates promoted to a CR position, 
and (3) the hiring official had selected no black applicants for any of the six CR 
positions that had become available over time, because the plaintiffs "evidence 
[did not] suggest[] racial discrimination"); cf. Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 
F.3d 1332, 1334 (2d Cir. 1997) (en bane) (reversing the trial court's finding of 
an Equal Pay Act violation and discrimination based on marital status and 
age, notwithstanding a "sustainable finding of pretext" because the facts did 
not support a finding of intentional discrimination), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 
(1998). 
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essentially transformed the circumstantial evidence case into 
one requiring direct evidence of discrimination. 
Recently, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 
Inc.,3IO the Supreme Court clarified its earlier decision in Hicks. 
The Reeves case began in 1996, when·Roger Reeves filed suit in 
federal district court in Mississippi, claiming that his employer 
had fired him because of his age.311 A jury found in Reeves's 
favor, concluding that his employer had engaged in "willful" 
age discrimination.312 The Fifth Circuit, which had adopted the 
pretext-plus standard, reversed the jury verdict, concluding 
that although Reeves may have presented evidence sufficient to 
demonstrate pretext, he had failed to show that age 
discrimination had motivated the employer to terminate him.313 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed, 
concluding that the Fifth Circuit had "misconceived the 
evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove 
intentional discrimination through indirect evidence."314 The 
Court explained that in Hicks it had held that while the prima 
facie case when coupled with evidence of pretext does not 
compel a finding of intentional discrimination for the plaintiff, 
neither does it preclude such a finding.315 In other words, the 
pretext-plus circuits had misinterpreted Hicks by requiring 
plaintiffs, in all cases, to provide evidence that not only was the 
employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason unworthy of 
In his dissent in St. Mary's Honor Center u. Hicks, Justice Souter 
predicted that the "'pretext-plus' approach would . . . result in summary 
judgment for the employer in the many cases where the plaintiff has no 
evidence beyond that required to prove a prima facie case and to show that the 
employer's articulated reasons are unworthy of credence." 509 U.S. 502, 535-
36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
310. 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). 
311. Id. at 2103. 
312. Id. at 2104. 
313. See id.; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 
688, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing a jury verdict for Reeves and concluding 
that even though Chestnut, one of three supervisors recommending Reeves's 
termination, had made "age-related comments" of a "damning nature," a jury 
could not find that Sanderson had terminated Reeves because of his age 
because Chestnut's comments were made several months before his dismissal, 
Chestnut was only one of three supervisors recommending Reeves's 
termination, two of the supervisors involved in the decision to dismiss Reeves 
were over the age of fifty, and twenty managers at the firm were over the age 
of fifty). 
314. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2108. 
315. Id. at 2108-10. 
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credence, but also that discrimination actually had motivated 
the challenged employment action. 
The Supreme Court's rejection of the pretext-plus approach 
may make it more difficult for employers to prevail on motions 
for summary judgment in those circuits that previously 
adhered to the pretext-plus standard.316 But it is unlikely that 
Re~ves will significantly affect the alarming rate at which the 
federal courts grant employer motions for summary judgment 
in circumstantial evidence cases. Reeves will do so only if two 
assumptions are true: first, the majority of cases in which 
plaintiffs lost on employers' motions for summary judgment 
occurred in circuits adhering to the pretext-plus approach; and, 
second, the former pretext-plus courts do not adopt other 
devices to achieve the same result they reached previously 
under the pretext-plus approach. Neither assumption is 
warranted. 
First, a majority of circuits never followed the mandatory 
pretext-plus approach rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Reeves. 3!7 While the pretext-plus circuits certainly contribute 
to the alarming rate at which the federal courts grant employer 
motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of 
law in circumstantial evidence cases, they only account for one-
third of the cases in which employers prevail on these 
motions.318 Thus, it is not simply plaintiffs in pretext-plus 
316. Some attorneys and academics have hailed Reeves as a victory for 
employment discrimination plaintiffs, concluding that fewer employers will 
file or prevail on motions for summary judgment. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, 
Dismissal of Bias Suits Harder: New High Court Bias Ruling May Spark More 
Jury Trials, Settlements, NAT'L L.J., June 26, 2000, at B1 (quoting Paul 
Mollica, a labor attorney, as saying that Reeves "should discourage companies 
from filing 'groundless' summary judgment motions"); Tony Mauro, Employees 
Who Sue to Get a Break: O'Connor Spurns 'Pretext-Plus,' LEGAL TIMES, June 
19, 2000, at 8 (quoting University of Washington law professor Eric Schnapper 
as saying "[a] lot more cases will get to a jury" because of Reeves). Others view 
Reeves as a "one-two punch to employers." Judy Greenwald, Litigation May 
Surge for Age Bias claims, Bus. INS., June 19, 2000, at 1 (quoting Sussan 
Mahallati Kysela, attorney for the National Chamber Litigation Center: 
"[Reeves] makes it easier for employees to win discrimination cases against 
their employers, or at least get their claims in front of a jury."). 
317. See supra note 307. 
318. Of the 197 cases in which the federal courts granted employers' 
motions for summary judgment (in part or in full) or judgment as a matter of 
law, or reversed jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs on plaintiffs' race, sex, race 
and sex, or retaliation claims (summary judgment cases), 69 (35%) were 
decided in pretext-plus circuits. Assuming-and this is a big assumption-
that the courts in pretext-plus circuits would not have granted an employer's 
motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, or reversed a 
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circuits that face substantial obstacles at the summary 
judgment stage. In fact, a number of circuits that have rejected 
pretext-plus employ other devices that make it much easier for 
employers to prevail on summary judgment motions. The 
Seventh Circuit, for example, has adopted the ''honest belief' 
standard, which transforms the circumstantial evidence case 
into a direct evidence case, much in the same way that the 
pretext-plus approach did. 319 The Tenth Circuit requires 
plaintiffs, even at the summary judgment stage, to provide 
evidence that they are "clearly'' or "overwhelmingly'' better 
qualified320 than the candidate selected by the employer. This 
is a standard few employment discrimination plaintiffs can 
satisfy, unless employers hire on the basis of only one objective 
qualification. 321 And, courts in several circuits that did not 
adopt the mandatory pretext-plus standard have redefined 
issues of fact as issues of law, thus making it easier for 
employers to prevail on motions for summary judgment. 322 
Although Reeves removes a convenient tool from the hands of 
judges deciding summary judgment motions, it has no effect on 
plaintiffs jury verdict had they been unable to avail themselves of the pretext-
plus analysis, plaintiffs still would have lost on these motions almost 50% of 
the time. (197 "summary judgment" cases minus the 69 cases in pretext-plus 
circuits leaves 128 cases of the 258 in the pool, or 49.6%.) See supra notes 12 
and 140. This still is a very high rate of summary judgment, given the fact 
that circumstantial evidence cases essentially involve questions of intent-a 
fact-based inquiry. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. 
319. See supra Part II.E. 
320. See supra Part II.D. 
321. See supra text accompanying notes 169-76. 
322. See, e.g., Gartman v. Gencorp Inc., 120 F.3d 127, 129, 131 (8th Cir. 
1997) (reversing the trial court's denial of the employer's motion for judgment 
as a matter of law on the plaintiffs sex discrimination claim, concluding that 
the division president's comment that the plaintiff did not know "how to belly 
up to the bar" was not a gender-based remark and that the division vice 
president's comment "S-t, another gal" in response to firm's naming a woman 
to monitor supplier quality was not relevant because it was made several 
months before the adverse employment action); Paulsboe v. Farnam Cos., No. 
97-7003, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19990, at *8-9 (lOth Cir. Aug. 1, 1997) 
(concluding that a supervisor's concern about the plaintiffs unwillingness to 
drink and socialize with clients, which the supervisor described "as being 'one 
of the guys,'" was not a gender-based comment); Malone v. K-Mart Corp., 51 F. 
Supp. 2d 1287, 1307-08, n.13 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (granting summary judgment 
on a retaliation claim, in part, because the plaintiffs poor performance 
evaluations, which she alleged were in retaliation for her race and sex 
discrimination complaints, occurred 10 months after plaintiffs EEOC charge 
and, hence, "were 'not temporally close enough to support an inference of 
causal connection.'" (citation omitted)); see also supra text accompanying notes 
195-210. 
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the "honest belief' analysis, the "overwhelmingly better 
qualified" standard, or the tendency of some federal courts to 
improperly characterize questions of fact as questions of law. 
Thus, Reeves does not affect plaintiffs' chances for surviving 
summary judgment in the non-pretext-plus circuits. 
Second, neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Circuit, both 
former pretext-plus circuits, relied exclusively on pretext-plus 
when granting employers' motions for summary judgment. 
They also made improper fact determinations,323 required 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were "clearly better 
qualified" than the candidate selected,324 invoked the "same 
323. See, e.g., Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(affirming the trial court's entry of judgment as a matter of law on the 
plaintiffs sex discrimination claim for failure to send her to the Police 
Academy, and concluding that plaintiff could not use a mixed-motive analysis 
because a statement by the plaintiffs supervisor, the Chief of the University 
police, that "'he was never going to send a female to the [Police] Academy'" was 
made "in response to [another officer's] question as to whether [the plaintiff] 
would be joining him in attending the Police Academy" and, thus, did not 
"'bear directly on the contested employment decision'" (citations omitted)); 
EEOC v. MCI Telecomms., Inc., No. 98-1195, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17847, at 
*9-10 (4th Cir. July 28, 1999) (affirming an order granting summary judgment 
in favor of the employer on the EEOC's claim of race and national origin 
discrimination and noting that the employer's statement that "he sought the 
most qualified candidates" and his subsequent statement that he hired one 
candidate "for his junior status and low billing rate" did not "rise[] to the level 
of mendacity"); Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326; 330 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming an order granting summary judgment for the employer on the 
plaintiffs race discrimination claim because "there was no evidence of a causal 
connection" between a supervisor's racist comment and the employer's failure 
to promote the plaintiff, even though the supervisor had been disciplined for 
the comment and the employer based its promotion decision on the 
supervisor's annual evaluation of the plaintiffs performance), cert. denied, 526 
U.S. 1051 (1999); Wright v. Tultex Corp., No. 97-0060-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20383, at *12-15 (W.D. Va. Dec. 14, 1998) (granting judgment as a 
matter of law in favor of the employer on the plaintiffs sex discrimination 
claim after declaring a mistrial, and accepting the employer's evidence at trial 
that the male candidate selected had a "clearly better organized" mock sales 
presentation, and dismissing the plaintiffs evidence that the male candidate 
had no college degree while she held an associate's degree by crediting the 
employer's explanation that "college degree required" meant a four-year 
degree, not an associate's degree). 
324. See, e.g., Harris v. Parker Hannifin Corp., No. 1:97-CV-254-B-D, 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13526, at *7 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 19, 1998) ("Where the 
employer's articulated reason for its action is based upon the judgment of the 
employer as to the qualifications of various applicants or employees, the 
plaintiff can create a genuine issue of pretext only by showing that she is 
clearly better qualified than the person who was hired or retained in the 
position." (citation omitted)); see also Nichols v. Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 568 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (in reversing the trial court verdict for the plaintiff on her sex 
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actor" inference,325 increased the plaintiffs burden in making 
out a prima facie case of discrimination, 326 and required 
discrimination claim, the court "note[d] that [the plaintiff had] failed to show 
that she was clearly better qualified than [the candidate selected] with respect 
to any of the listed selection criteria" (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). 
325. Some courts infer, or even presume, that no discrimination exists 
when the individual who made the challenged termination or, in some cases, 
promotion decision originally had hired the plaintiff whose complaint of 
employment discrimination is before the court. Both the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits employ the "same actor" inference. See, e.g., Islar v. Ourisman 
Chevrolet Co., No. 97-2641, No. 98-1185, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 538, at *6 (4th 
Cir. Jan. 15, 1999) (affirming an order granting summary judgment on the 
black male plaintiffs' Section 1981 race discrimination claims for failure to 
promote, crediting the employer's explanation that it had relied on the 
recommendation of the plaintiffs' supervisor, who had hired the plaintiffs); 
Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326, 330 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming 
an order granting summary judgment in favor of the employer on the black 
male plaintiffs Title VII race discrimination claim and noting that its 
"disposal of the [plaintiffs claims on other grounds] foreclose[d] the necessity 
of a second analysis of the case under the 'same actor' inference" previously 
adopted by the Fifth Circuit (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1051 
(1999). For a summary of circuits that use the "same actor" inference, see 
Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1442-43 (11th Cir. 1998). The 
Eleventh Circuit has declined to adopt the "same actor" inference, concluding 
that "it is the province of the jury rather than the court . . . to determine 
whether the inference generated by 'same actor' evidence is strong enough to 
outweigh a plaintiffs evidence of pretext." Id. at 1443 (footnote omitted). 
For a critique of the "same actor" inference as applied to the promotion 
context, see Taylor, 193 F.3d at 246-47 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (opining 
that the "same actor" inference should not apply with equal vigor to promotion 
decisions because "[t]he thought of an employer hiring an individual in a 
protected class and, for discriminatory reasons, keeping that person in an 
entry-level station, i.e., hindering the employee from advancing to the ranks of 
management or into a higher paying position, is not nearly as incredulous as 
the majority urges"). See generally supra text accompanying notes 88-128 for 
a discussion of evaluation bias, which can affect decisions to promote blacks 
and women. 
326. See Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 
1999). In Brinkley, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the employer country club, agreeing that the 
plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination based 
on the employer's demotion and termination of plaintiff as general manager. 
See id. at 616-17. Crediting the employer's deposition testimony, the Fourth 
Circuit explained that the plaintiff had not satisfied the third element of the 
prima facie case because she had not been performing satisfactorily prior to 
her termination, in large part because she had proved unable to "form a 
cohesive management team." Id. at 609-10. The court also noted that the 
plaintiff had not satisfied the fourth element of the prima facie case because 
she and her replacement were not similarly qualified; her replacement had 
substantially more experience in managing country clubs. Id. at 610. 
The problem with the Fourth Circuit's analysis is that it improperly 
increases the plaintiffs burden at the prima facie stage of the circumstantial 
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plaintiffs to provide substantial evidence ofpretext,327 all in aid 
of granting employers' motions for summary judgment or 
evidence case. First, the plaintiff offered evidence that part of her problems in 
building a cohesive management team stemmed from sex discrimination. One 
member of her team, the greens superintendent, informed the employer that 
"he wasn't sure he could work for a woman." ld. at 604. If sex or race 
discrimination affects an employee's performance evaluation, which 
subsequently leads to that employee's termination, the circumstantial 
evidence case is worthless if the employer merely needs to put forward 
questionable performance evaluations to completely discredit plaintiffs prima 
facie case. The court would never get to the ultimate issue: Did sex or race 
discrimination improperly influence the performance reviews, thus paving the 
way for the plaintiffs termination? See supra text accompanying notes 88-128 
(discussing the impact of sex and race discrimination on the evaluation of 
blacks and women). 
Second, even assuming that the replacement's superior qualifications are 
relevant in the termination context, it is the employer's burden to produce 
those qualifications as its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The 
plaintiff/employee then has the opportunity to argue pretext. See Bullington 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1316 n.ll (lOth Cir. 1999) (stating 
that allowing the employer to challenge the plaintiffs prima facie case by 
challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiffs qualifications, once the plaintiff 
establishes she is minimally qualified for position, improperly "short circuit[s] 
the McDonnell Douglas framework" and restricts the court's ability to evaluate 
the plaintiffs evidence of pretext (citation omitted)); Walker v. Mortham, 158 
F.3d 1177, 1183-94 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that Eleventh Circuit 
precedent does not require a plaintiff to provide evidence that she is equally or 
better qualified than the candidate selected as part of her prima facie case), 
reh'g en bane, denied, 167 F.3d 542 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 39 
(1999). • 
327. E.g., Boyd, 158 F.3d at 329 (stating that because the plaintiff"focused 
solely on proving pretext" his case fell "within the Rhodes subcategory of cases 
where '[a] jury may be able to infer discriminatory intent . . . solely from 
substantial evidence that the employer's proffered reasons are false'" 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Nichols v. Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 566 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (noting that in order "for a plaintiff to successfully bootstrap himself 
into a finding of intentional discrimination [with evidence of pretext alone], 
the evidence offered to counter the employer's proffered reasons must be 
substantial" (citation omitted)); cf. Alvarez v. Motorola, Inc., No. 97-17214, 
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2071, at *4 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1999) (stating that a 
plaintiff can survive an employer's motion for summary judgment in a direct 
evidence case "'even if the evidence is not substantial,'" but must present 
"'specific' and 'substantial'" evidence of pretext in order to prevail on an 
employer's motion for summary judgment in a circumstantial evidence case 
(citations omitted)). 
Reeves now precludes federal courts from requiring a plaintiff to 
demonstrate more than pretext in order to prevail against her employer, but it 
says nothing about the substantial evidence requirement. Thus, federal courts 
can continue to use the substantial evidence test at the summary judgment 
stage, thereby increasing the plaintiffs burden beyond that contemplated by 
the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2109 (2000) (stating that a trier of fact could find 
that the employer had engaged in unlawful discrimination on the basis of the 
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judgment as a matter of law. And, in retaliation cases, the 
Fifth Circuit's requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that the 
retaliatory conduct involve "ultimate employment decisions"328 
operates in a manner similar to the pretext-plus standard by 
making it impossible for plaintiffs complaining of a wide range 
of potentially retaliatory behavior-including disciplinary 
action,329 supervisory reprimands,330 poor performance 
reviews,33l and even failure to be considered for promotion332_ 
to survive employers' motions for summary judgment. Thus, 
even with the demise of the pretext-plus standard, courts prone 
to dismiss circumstantial evidence cases at the summary 
judgment stage have other tools available for doing so. 
Finally, the interpretation given to the Supreme Court's 
decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks333 by the former 
pretext-plus circuits indicates that these courts adhere to the 
meritocracy myth's traditional concept of discrimination.334 
Hicks was an ambiguous decision, susceptible to two 
interpretations.335 The former pretext-plus circuits could have 
read Hicks as permitting judgment for the employer in some 
cases in which the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of 
discrimination and presents some evidence of pretext.336 
plaintiffs prima facie case coupled with sufficient evidence of pretext). 
328. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707-10 (5th Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997); see supra note 194. 
329. Mattern, 10~ F.3d at 708 (holding that "disciplinary filings" do not 
constitute an adverse employment action, which is a necessary element of a 
Title VII retaliation claim). 
330. Id. (holding that a "supervisor's reprimands" do not constitute an 
adverse employment action, which is a necessary element of a Title VII 
retaliation claim); Wakefield v. State Farm Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 545, 549 
(N.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that an "employer's monitoring of a [sic] employee 
and criticism of his work does [sic] not rise to the level of an ultimate 
employment decision" (citation omitted)). 
331. Wakefield, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (observing that poor performance 
evaluations do not constitute ultimate employment decision). 
332. Id. (holding that the failure of an employer to consider an employee for 
promotion is not an ultimate employment decision, particularly when 
promotion involves a lateral transfer without a change in compensation or 
benefits). 
333. 509 u.s. 502 (1993). 
334. See supra Part LB. 
335. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
336. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (holding that evidence that the employer's 
reasons are a pretext when coupled with the elements of the prima facie case 
permits, but does not compel, judgment for the plaintiff); see also Reeves, 120 
S. Ct. at 2109 (holding that the plaintiffs prima facie case coupled with 
sufficient evidence of pretext "may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the 
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Instead, these circuits read Hicks as mandating judgment for 
the employer in all cases, even at the summary judgment stage, 
unless the plaintiff provided the equivalent of direct evidence of 
discrimination. 337 This insistence on direct evidence of 
discrimination, even in circumstantial evidence cases, reveals a 
belief that only claims of overt, conscious, and negative bias 
trigger the protections of employment discrimination law. 
Reeves does little to alter this misguided conception of 
discrimination; it merely precludes the federal courts from 
using one of many tools available-the pretext-plus standard-
as a way to achieve results consistent with the meritocracy 
myth's assumptions about employment discrimination.338 
CONCLUSION 
As the number of Americans who adhere to overtly racist 
and sexist beliefs declines, expressions of traditional forms of 
prejudice have become increasingly rare. Yet discrimination in 
employment based on race and sex has not disappeared; it has 
merely changed form. A growing body of research reveals that 
discrimination in today's market does not look like our 
traditional notions of bias and often does not manifest itself in 
overt ways. Instead, modern racism and sexism is difficult to 
identify, because of the culture's dominant focus on 
discrimination as overt and negative bias. 
The federal courts could play an important role in 
reshaping the field of discrimination law . by adapting the 
flexible McDonnell Douglas framework for circumstantial 
evidence cases to account for the modern ways in which 
discrimination operates in today's workplace. Instead, many 
federal courts have transformed the circumstantial evidence 
case into a "toothless tiger." By erecting numerous hurdles for 
plaintiffs to clear at the summary judgment stage, many 
federal courts make it much easier for employers to prevail on 
motions for summary judgment. 
employer unlawfully discriminated [but t]his is not to say that such a showing 
by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability" 
(emphasis in original)). 
337. See supra text accompanying notes 307-09. 
338. Courts in both the former pretext-only and pretext-plus circuits have 
used many other devices besides pretext-plus to assist them in granting 
employers' motions for summary judgment. See supra text accompanying 
notes 317-32. 
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Unfortunately, while the need for oversight is great, 
especially given the subtle ways in which modern 
discrimination operates, the federal courts increasingly are 
abdicating their responsibility to ensure that employment 
practices are truly fair. This merely reinforces the dominant 
mythology that employment practices are merit driven, and 
race and gender neutral. Moreover, with the mounting attacks 
on affirmative action and the federal courts' increased 
reluctance to look beyond the surface of challenged employment 
decisions, the avenues available to blacks and women for 
obtaining redress for modern employment discrimination are 
rapidly shrinking. 
